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Abstract 
In 2013, trade negotiations began between the United States and the European Union to 
create a free trade agreement with the goal of phasing out tariffs for all but the most sensitive 
products. To aid negotiators in analyzing potential agriculture agreements, the objective of this 
study is to quantify policy impacts of a potential trade liberalization of rice. This study will also 
be a useful analysis for various participants in the rice market to make educated business 
decisions. 
This study utilizes the spatial partial equilibrium model RICEFLOW to project the 
differences in market prices, production volumes, trade volumes, and consumption volumes that 
would result from a 10 year straight line decrease of bilateral import tariffs. The global rice 
market is disaggregated by rice type and milling level in the model, which helps to generate 
interesting results that would not be apparent in a model that is more highly aggregated. 
The results suggest US rice becomes more competitive in the EU market causing an 
increase in the US rice prices. US production is projected to increase greatly, both in paddy 
production and the milling sector from the trade policy reform. EU production is projected to 
decrease. The results suggest that there will be some substitution by type in the EU as a result of 
the agreement.  
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1. Introduction  
A. Background of the TTIP negotiations 
i. Objective of partnership 
The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations began in July 
2013 after the High Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth (High Level Working Group, 
2013) recommended the reduction of barriers to trade between the European Union (EU) and the 
United States (US) (European Commission, 2014) (USTR, 2013). The move toward freer trade is 
designed to promote economic growth and create more jobs in both economies (USTR, 2013). 
The recommended course of action is estimated to create a gross domestic product (GDP) 
increase of €68.2-119.2 billion for the EU and €49.5-94.9 billion for the US. The estimated 
impact on GDP when removing tariffs alone are €23.7 billion increase for the EU and €9.4 
billion increase for the US (Francois, Manchin, Norberg, Pindyuk, & Tomberger, 2013). 
The HLWG recommended eliminating all duties and phasing out “all but the most 
sensitive tariffs in a short time frame” (HLWG, 2013, p. 3). The group also recommended 
advancing cooperation involving sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures beyond the current 
status of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This advancement of cooperation is referred to 
as “SPS-plus”. The HLWG also recommended advancing cooperation in the removal of 
technical barriers to trade (TBT) between the regions beyond the current status of the WTO 
regulations. This cooperation is referred to as “TBT-plus”. These measures will be necessary in 
order to reduce non-tariff barriers to trade by establishing ongoing communication about the 
topics. The goal of this newly established communication would be to eliminate unnecessary 
double testing and agree upon acceptable standards with justification grounded  by scientific 
proof (High Level Working Group, 2013).    
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ii. Importance of Agriculture and Food Trade Policy 
There is a long list of reasons why countries have failed to liberalize trade in agriculture. 
These reasons are embedded in the importance of food for survival and the necessity of a stable 
supply of food at all times. Agriculture also has great economic significance and political power 
in both the EU and US. In this section I will discuss the significance to the global market of 
liberalizing the trade of agricultural products between the US and EU.  
The first major multilateral agreement on agriculture in the WTO took place during The 
Uruguay Round in 1994 and is known as the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) (WTO, 1994).  
Manufacturing had already been through eight rounds of trade reform (Hart & Beghin, 2004). 
The AoA was a major success for the time, considering there had not been a prior WTO 
agreement in the agricultural sector. Even though market liberalization resulting from the 
agreement was relatively modest, it created a framework by which trade barriers became more 
transparent.  
Despite efforts to expand market access for agricultural goods in subsequent WTO 
rounds of negotiations, policies for agricultural products still suffer high levels of protectionism 
(Grant, Hertel, & Rutherford, 2006a). It is argued that high levels of agricultural protectionism 
have contributed to derailing advancement in recent multilateral trade negotiations, such as the 
Doha Round, where agriculture has been a major focal point (Miller et al., 2008).  
The Doha Round, or more formally, the Doha Development Round, is the most recent 
WTO round of negotiations to attempt to reduce barriers to trade. The Doha Round began from a 
commitment included in the AoA stating that by the end of 1999, new negotiations on 
agricultural policy had to start. By November 2001, the Doha Ministerial Declaration was 
approved. It stated the goals of the negotiations to be: 1) improving market access, 2) moving to 
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phase out export subsidies, and 3) reducing trade-distorting domestic support (WTO, 2001). The 
negotiations have continued through 2014. The next work program to organize a schedule and 
continue working on the round was expected to be completed in December 2014 (Azevêdo, 
2014). An update shows that the deadline for the work program has been extended to July 2015 
(Azevêdo, 2015).  
The Bali Package is the latest Ministerial agreement (WTO, 2013a). The package states 
that the goals for multilateral agricultural policy are to advance regulations for the administration 
of tariff rate quotas (TRQ) to ensure importers below the tariff quota fill line are operating fairly 
(WTO, 2013c). The tariff fill line is the ratio of imports for a specific good and the specified 
quota for that good. It is a measurement to determine if a TRQ has been filled. In this 
declaration, if less than 65% of the quota has been filled, then the importing country must prove 
this low level of imports is not due to their own administrative processes causing a Non-Tariff 
Barrier (NTB). It also states that members should work to identify and remove export 
competition policies (WTO, 2013b).  
The breaking point of negotiations in 2008 was between India, China, and the US. India 
and China wanted a lower level of import surges required to activate the Special Safeguard 
Measure 1(SSM) and the US would not compromise from its position on the higher level for the 
trigger (Miller et al., 2008). In a larger picture, there are two sides that explain this breaking 
point. First, the developing powers believed that the developed countries of the US and the EU 
have too much domestic production support. Second, the US and EU believed that the 
                                                 
1 Safeguard measures defined by the WTO are “‘emergency’ actions with respect to 
increased imports particular products, where such imports have caused or threaten to cause 
serious injury to the importing Member’s domestic industry (Article 2).”Agricultural goods have 
special provisions for safeguards which allow for a higher level of market protection.  
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developing countries needed to agree to lower import tariffs for non-agricultural market access 
(Ismail, 2009).  
Considering the two major powers had similar stances in the WTO agriculture rounds, it 
would be a step forward in trade policy for the two powers to reduce agricultural trade barriers in 
the TTIP.  
 
B. Objective: Ex Ante Evaluation of Liberalizing Rice Trade between the United States and 
European Union 
The objective of this thesis is to conduct an empirical analysis to assess the potential 
impacts on regional production, regional demand, and bilateral trade flow changes driven by the 
changes in price resulting from the liberalization of rice trade between the United States (US) 
and the European Union (EU). 
Based on the partial equilibrium theory of international trade in Figure 7 on page 33 in 
the Method of Analysis, this study anticipates the expected results of trade reform in TTIP to be: 
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Figure 1: List of Alternative Hypotheses for this Study 
EU Market Impacts 
• Price will decrease 
• Production and milling volume will decrease  
• Volume of consumption will increase 
• Imports will increase 
• Bilateral Trade will increase with US 
US Market Impacts 
• Price will increase 
• Production and milling volume will increase  
• Volume of consumption will decrease 
• Exports will increase 
• Bilateral trade will increase with EU  
Importing Third Countries 
• Price will increase 
• Production will increase 
• Consumption will decrease 
Exporting Third countries  
• Price will either increase or decrease 
• Production will either decrease or increase 
• Volume of consumption will either increase or decrease 
 
C. Overview of Current Barriers to Free Trade in Rice between US and EU 
i. EU Import Tariffs 
European Union (EU) tariff levels vary according to the level of milling. The tariff rates 
and policies are presented in Table 1 (European Commission, 2015).  
While paddy rice does not require an import license the applied import duty is €211/mt 
(European Commission, 2008)(European Commission, 2015).  
The tariff rate quotas for milled and brown rice are decided twice a year. They can be 
changed at the beginning of the marketing year or in the middle of the marketing year, based on 
the level of imports during the previous six months. The rice marketing year in the European 
Community is September 1 to August 31 (European Commission, 2015). 
6 
 
Table 1: EU TRQs for Rice Imports 
  EU TRQs for Rice Imports 
  
Paddy Brown (husked) 
Milled/ Semi-
milled 
Broken  
Price of Tariff 
€/MT 
€211 
a = €30 
b = €42.5 
c = €65 
 
a = €145 
b = €175 
 
€65 
Quantity 
imported 
previous 6 
months   
a < 382,326   
382,326< b < 517,130  
c > 517,130 
a < 387,743 
b > 387,743 
  
 
ii. Other EU Bilateral Trade Agreements  
There are also other special TRQs for imports of rice into the EU as summarized in Table 
2. These TRQs are discussed below as they are laid out in the informational note for the EU rice 
regime (European Commission, 2015)Error! Reference source not found..  
The EU has multiple bilateral trade agreements that result in zero import tariffs for rice. 
The Africa, Caribbean and Pacific states (ACP) and the Caribbean sub-group CARIFORUM 
states, as defined by EU Regulation, enjoy duty and quota-free access for all types of rice 
(European Commission, 2015). The most notable countries with this distinction for rice trade are 
Suriname and Guyana.  
Countries included in the Everything But Arms (EBA) development policy also have 
duty-free access to the European rice market. EBA is a policy that removes tariffs and quotas for 
all goods, except armaments, that originate in the Least Developed Countries (LDC) (European 
Commission, 2013c). Free trade privileges were reinstated for Myanmar in 2013 (European 
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Commission, 2013a). Cambodia is the most notable rice exporting country with the EBA 
distinction. In 2013 Cambodia was the second largest exporter of rice to the EU, following India. 
Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) have zero tariff until exports reach the tariff 
rate quota of 35,000 tons of husked rice equivalent. Twenty-five thousand tons are allowed for 
Netherland Antilles (Aruba, Bonaire, and Curaçao)  and ten thousand tons are allowed for the 
countries considered least-developed OCT including: Anguilla, Mayotte, Montserrat, Saint 
Helena, Ascension Island, Tristan da Cunha, Turks and Caicos Islands, Wallis and Futuna 
Islands, and St. Pierre and Miquelon. These quotas are divided equally into three sub-periods 
which are January to May, May to September and September to January (European Commission, 
2009). The above is what this study modeled. However, beginning on the 1st of January 2014, 
this TRQ is no longer in effect (European Commission, 2015). 
India and Pakistan have duty-free, quota-free access to import nine different varieties of 
husked Basmati (European Commission, 2015).  
The EU grants Bangladesh a tariff rate quota of 4,000 tons of husked equivalent, for 
which the import duty is reduced by 50%. (European Commission, 2006) 
Egypt receives different duty-free quotas for different levels of processed rice. The 
quotas for each level of processing increase by three percent until 2015. For example, 2014 
quotas will increase by three percent in 2015, and then stay at the 2015 levels for an 
undetermined length of time. For husked rice the 2014 quota is 22,510 tons, for semi- or wholly-
milled rice the quota is 78,786 tons, and for broken rice the quota is 90,041 tons (European 
Commission, 2001). 
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Table 2: EU TRQs for rice imports 2014 
  Specified EU TRQs for Rice Imports 2014 
  
Paddy 
Brown 
(husked) 
Milled/ 
Semi-
milled 
Broken  All 
OCT (MT)         35000 
- Duty 0 0 0 0 0 
EBA (MT) ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 
- Duty 0 0 0 0 0 
Bangladesh (MT)         4000 
- Duty 
50% of 
normal 
tariff rate 
50% of 
normal 
tariff rate 
50% of 
normal 
tariff 
rate 
50% of normal 
tariff rate 
50% of 
normal 
tariff 
rate 
India/Pakistan 
(MT) 
0 ∞ 0 0 0 
- Duty 
Normal 
0€ for 
husked 
Basmati 
Normal Normal   
Egypt (MT) 0 22,510 78,786 90,041   
- Duty Normal 0 € 0 € 0 €   
WTO quotas 
(MT) 
7 1,634 103,216 132,788   
- Duty 
15% ad 
valorem 
15% ad 
valorem 
0 
32,788MT with 
0€ duty; 
100,000MT 
with 30.77€ 
reduction   
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iii. US Import Tariffs 
The US has relatively low trade barriers on imported rice. Paddy (rough) rice, brown rice, 
milled rice, and broken rice are open to free trade for imports from least developed beneficiary 
countries eligible for Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), Australia, Bahrain, Canada, 
Chile, Colombia, Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) countries2, Caribbean Basin 
Initiative countries3, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Morocco, Mexico, Oman, Panama, Peru, and 
Singapore.  
Parboiled imports tariffs are on an ad valorem basis. There is free trade for the same 
countries listed above except the list includes all of the GSP countries, and excludes the AGOA 
countries. There is a special rate of 8.9% ad valorem for South Korea (USITC, 2014). Finally for 
countries not mentioned parboiled rice imports have an 11.2% tariff.  
                                                 
2 Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, 
Comores, Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, 
Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia 
3 Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Montserrat, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, 
Panama, St. Christopher and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands 
10 
 
Table 3: US Tariffs for Rice Imports 
 
iv. Production in the US and EU 
While rice accounts for a relatively small portion of total agricultural production in the 
US and the EU, it is extremely important for specific regions and localities within both the US 
and the EU.  
In the US, rice accounted for 1.5% of the value of total crop production in the US in 2013 
(NASS, 2015). However, rice accounted for 4.4% of the bulk total commodity value of exports 
from the US (USDA, 2014). Rice is produced in Arkansas, California, Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Missouri, and Texas. On average, from 2009-2013, Arkansas produced about 45% of the total 
US rice and California produced about 22%. Arkansas, California and Louisiana account for 
over 80% of the total rice produced in the US (Childs, 2014). From 2009 to 2013 US production 
averaged 10,540 thousand metric tons (tmt) paddy equivalent. On average from 2009 to 2013 
long grain varieties accounted for almost 70% of total rice production (Childs, 2014). 
Of total long grain production, Arkansas accounted for over half of the production, and 
together with Louisiana account for more than 80% of the production. California is the only state 
that produces a very small amount of total US long grain rice production. Medium grain varieties 
are grown in all rice growing states, except for Mississippi. California averages more than 75% 
Paddy Brown Basmati Other Brown Milled Broken Parboiled
($/MT) ($/MT) ($/MT) ($/MT) ($/MT) (% ad valorem)
GSP Countries 18 8.3 21 14 4.4 0
Least 
Developed 
GSP Countries
0 0 0 0 0 0
AGOA 
Countries
0 0 0 0 0 11.2
South Korea 0 0 0 0 0 8.9
Rest of World 18 8.3 21 14 4.4 11.2
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of the US production of medium grain. California combined with Arkansas produce more than 
95% of the medium grain. Short grain rice is grown almost exclusively in California with a small 
amount also grown in Arkansas (Childs, 2014).  
Agriculture accounts for 3.8% of the total GDP of Arkansas in 2013 (U.S. Department of 
Commerce, 2015). Rice accounted for 12.5% of the total agricultural receipts and about 25% of 
the cash receipts from crops in 2012 in Arkansas. Arkansas rice accounted for 41.8% of the total 
receipts for rice in the US (NASS, 2013). In 2009, rice production and milling contributed $6.08 
billion to the Arkansas economy, and contributed to the creation of 25,835 jobs (Richardson & 
Outlaw, 2010). Next was California where rice production and milling contributed $5.423 billion 
to the economy and contributed to the creation of 24,941 jobs (Richardson & Outlaw, 2010). 
While in the entire US this is a relatively small number, in the regions that the production exists, 
these values are very important.  
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Figure 2: Production per Harvested Acre by County in the US, 2013 
 
Source: USDA-NASS 
In the EU, rice is produced in Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, France, Romania, and 
Bulgaria. From 2009 to 2013, Italian producers were responsible for about half of the total 
production and Spain was responsible for about 30% of total production on average. Both long 
and short grain varieties are grown in the EU. Medium grain varieties account for about two-
thirds of total production (FAOSTAT, 2014). However, from 2010 to 2013 the medium grain 
percentage of total EU production varied as much as 2.8% from the previous year (European 
Commission, 2013b).  
Most of the rice grown in Italy and Spain are from a select few regions, shown in  
Figure 3: Map of Rice Growing Regions in Italy and Error! Reference source not 
found.. The most notable regions in Italy are Lombardia and Piemonte with 41% and 54% of the 
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rice acres in Italy, respectively. The most notable regions in Spain are Andalucía and Cataluña 
with 26% and 24% of the rice acres in Spain, respectively.  
Rice is an important ingredient in cultural dishes for these countries. Risotto in Italy and 
paella in Spain are common dishes with rice bases. Rice production started in Italy around the 
middle of the 15th century (FAO, 2004) and helped to economically develop areas that were 
previously unsuitable for habitation. Now the rice fields are important in keeping in balance a 
fragile ecosystem (CGIAR, n.d.).  
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Figure 3: Map of Rice Growing Regions in Italy 
 
Source: NOAA 
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Figure 4: Map of Rice Growing Regions in Spain 
 
Source: NOAA 
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v. Rice Trade in the EU and US 
From 2006 to 2014 the US exported an average of 50% of both medium and long grain 
rice production. The US also imported a portion of rice for domestic use, primarily fragrant 
(aromatic) jasmine and basmati rice. From 2006 to 2014, the amount of total imported rice 
averaged 16.5% of domestic use. While fragrant rice was the primary rice type imported, long 
grain imports were equal to 18.3% of domestic use, and medium grain imports were equal to 
11% of domestic use (Childs, 2014).  
The EU exported about 10% of total rice production between 2009 and 2014, 14% and 
3.8% of the medium grain and long grain crops, respectively. A greater amount of rice for 
consumption was imported into the EU. While only 7.3% of domestically used medium grain 
rice was imported, 55% of domestically used long grain rice was imported into the EU 
(European Commission, 2013b) 
The US exported an average of 330 tmt of rice to the European Union from 2000-2005, 
compared to an average of only 80.5 tmt from 2007 to 2013. From 2005 to 2007 there was a 85% 
decrease in the rice imports by the EU from the US (UN, 2015). Although in 2008 the trade of 
rice imported by the EU from the United States increased, in 2011 it was 57% lower than it was 
in 2005, and in 2013 it was 82% lower than trade levels in 2005 (UN, 2015).  
The genetically modified (GM) Liberty Link Rice contamination event in 2006 in the US 
caused the great decrease of imports to the EU from the US. This is explained in the following 
section.  
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Figure 5 Historical EU Rice Imports: World vs US 
 
Source: UN Comtrade 
While EU imports of rice from the US decreased greatly, total rice imports increased 
(Figure 5). From 2000-2005 the EU imported an annual average of 1,257 tmt while from 2007-
2013 the EU imported 1,478 tmt. These figures show that the decrease in US rice imports into 
the EU was not due to a decrease in overall demand.  
 
vi. GMO Contamination Event in 2006 
The EU has a zero tolerance policy against the presence of unauthorized genetically 
modified (GM) products, or accidental presence (Viju, Yeung, & Kerr, 2011). In the case that 
unauthorized GM products are detected, EU officials can take significant actions which include 
emergency measures. These measures have only been enacted three times since the European 
Regulation (EC) 1829/2003 was enacted, and in every instance the GM variety in question was 
not approved by either the EU or the country of origin. One of these instances involved a variety 
of GM rice known as Liberty Link rice (LL601) with an origin in the US. (Viju et al., 2011) 
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In 2006 trace amounts of LL601 were found in commercial rice supplies in Arkansas and 
Missouri. Two weeks after this initial finding, the USDA publically announced that the 
unapproved rice variety was found in supplies that were bound for human consumption and 
export. Shortly after this public notice, the EU and other countries banned all shipments of US 
rice unless the rice was tested, and confirmed to not contain any of the unapproved GM rice 
varieties. After these measures were enacted, there were no more European purchases of US 
long-grain rice until 2008.  
While it was expected to see major price decreases in US rice exports after this incident, 
there was a decrease for only a few weeks. One would also expect that competitor prices would 
increase as the demand for their rice would increase. However, Thai prices were not significantly 
higher (Li, Wailes, McKenzie, & Thomsen, 2010). 
The rice contamination can explain the substantial decrease in imports for a short period 
of time from the US. The amount of EU rice imports from the US remains relatively small. 
Importers in the EU claim that the extensive efforts to remove the GM traits from export supply 
have reduced their concerns (Cummings, 2013). Stating the only deterrent from importing US 
rice, is that the price is not competitive anymore (Cummings, 2013). Other exporters, especially 
from South America and Asia, have gained this market share.  
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Figure 6: Major Origins of EU Rice Imports 
 
Source: UN Comtrade  
 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
R
ic
e
  
(t
m
t)
Major EU Rice Import Origins
Cambodia India Thailand Uruguay USA
20 
 
2. Literature Review  
A. Debunking Black Box Idea of Equilibrium Models 
A wide variety of modeling approaches to assess trade reform are available, including 
computable general equilibrium (CGE), partial equilibrium (PE) and gravity models. Equilibrium 
models are deemed by some people in the policy and economics arena to be a “black box” in 
which it is difficult for non-modelers to connect the results to the data and algebraic modeling 
(Wing, 2004). There is thought to be a steep learning curve for people without extensive 
experience using these models (Böhringer, Rutherford, & Wiegard, n.d.). While there is a steep 
learning curve to understanding the programming of these models, if provided with the proper 
files, one has the opportunity to analyze the researcher’s work to the smallest detail.  
For more technical explanations with mathematical representations one can read the 
discussion paper by Böhringer, Rutherford, and Wiegard, (n.d.) or the technical note by Wing 
(2004). 
 
B. Computable General Equilibrium v. Partial Equilibrium for Rice Trade 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models provide very useful insight into the 
general economic effects of trade liberalization. However, they suffer from specificity problems 
associated with the aggregation of separate sectors that have distinctly different policies. The 
aggregation of products can result in assigning the same policy and values to products with very 
different realities. Aggregation decisions of researchers can lead to different results while 
studying the same trade policy change scenarios (Bureau & Salvatici, 2003). Partial equilibrium 
(PE) models usually take a closer look into specific sectors, while assuming separation from 
other economic sectors. For these reasons PE models can be capable of more accurately 
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portraying the subtleties within specific sectors. However, this characteristic inhibits the ability 
to capture the broader effects of trade policy, including changes in industries or markets related 
to the specific market analyzed in the PE model (Grant, Hertel, & Rutherford, 2006b). 
Both frameworks have pros and cons that should be weighted before making a selection. 
In the case of studying the global rice market, it is important to be able to disaggregate the 
different product types. As noted above, both the US and the EU have different tariff regimes for 
different rice products by level of processing. This implies that a study of bilateral rice trade 
reform would benefit more by using a more disaggregated approach, because failing to 
disaggregate the differing tariffs would ultimately fail to capture potential impacts specific to 
specific segments of the rice market.  
 
C. EU and Canada Free Trade Agreement Studies 
Kitou and Phillippidis (2010) studied the potential gains from trade that would result 
from a Canada-EU free-trade agreement. Using the initial tariff offers from the EU and Canada, 
they estimated that sensitive product exceptions reduce combined real income gains for Canada 
the EU. Trade diversion was estimated for the US and the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA). China was estimated to see small effects on trade. The researchers accounted for the 
likely CAP (Common Agricultural Program) reform by reducing the single farm payment by two 
percent per annum. They ran two scenarios, in which the first scenario simulated complete 
liberalization, and the second scenario examined the impacts of sensitive product exemptions. 
The study was also able to compute the effects of NTBs in service sectors by using an 
econometric study previously published by a joint effort of the European Union and Government 
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of Canada (European Union and Government of Canada, 2008). They employed a two percent 
assumption of NTB cost-saving for non-commodity goods sectors used in the same study. 
In the full liberalization scenario, the EU was estimated to have larger total gains for 
welfare and production changes. The study noted that estimated domestic prices of some goods 
increased due to the pressure on input factor prices from increases in economic activity. Due to 
trade competitiveness, in the full liberalization scenario the researchers estimated a large output 
increase for Canadian wheat, and a decrease of wheat production in the EU. Canadian production 
in other agricultural areas was estimated to fall due to land reallocation to wheat and the 
downstream sectors of vegetable oils and fats. The projected values for Canada’s vegetables, 
fruits and nuts, sector only decreased slightly in output, but the dairy industry decreased, while 
the EU dairy sector grew slightly. Primary agricultural production was estimated to increase in 
Canada and fall in the EU. Aggregate agro-industry production was projected to fall in Canada 
and increase by in the EU. 
In the second scenario, where sensitive products remain protected, the estimated 
equivalent variation benefits decreased in Canada and the EU. The sensitive products in the 
scenario were agricultural products as well as textiles, clothing, and manufacturing. Most of the 
trade diversion effects for the third countries were mitigated by the protection of the sensitive 
products, because the third countries retained their trade advantage. Another notable part is that 
one of the sensitive products for the EU was wheat, and one for Canada was dairy products. Both 
products were major components in the welfare impact projections for the first scenario. 
Compared to the first scenario, under the second scenario Canadian agriculture and fishing 
production decreased in relation to the baseline and the aggregate land use decreased. The 
estimated benefits for the EU in the agricultural production sector increased compared to the first 
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scenario, but the EU dairy production decreased due to the simulated Canadian protection, while 
the Canadian dairy producers were estimated to benefit from the protection.  
The researchers concluded that trade creation would exceed trade diversion in these 
scenarios. This conclusion was consistent with two other studies on the trade agreement. They 
also concluded that Canada would see larger gains considering the relative size of the EU in 
Canada’s overall trade. They remarked that both sides of the potential agreement had good 
political reasons to increase market access, but there were obvious impediments, including 
lobbying groups for the industries – that would be negatively impacted locally – food processing 
regulations, ownership restrictions, and disaggregated political powers in the EU. 
 
D. NAFTA Free Trade Agreement Study 
Naanwaab and Yeboah (2012) conducted an ex-post study of the trade effects on 
agricultural products in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Since the 
agreement became active, trade increased between the US and the other trade partners, especially 
Mexico. Agricultural trade increased more than 300 percent between the US and the other 
partners from 1994 to 2010. The US had an overall trade deficit as well as a deficit in goods. 
Obviously there were other factors involved with this growth, but the NAFTA effects were 
generally positive (Zahniser & Roe, 2011). The US total trade with NAFTA partners increased 
78% percent. It increased 141% with Mexico alone, while trade growth with the rest of the world 
only increased 43% from 1993 to 2002. There was higher trade growth with Mexico compared to 
Canada, which was likely a result of the Canada-US Trade Agreement (CUSTA). CUSTA had 
already been in place for five years. The products that experienced the largest increases in trade 
were the products that had the highest level of tariff and non-tariff barrier reductions (Zahniser & 
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Roe, 2011). Studies of the impact on rural employment in the US, which was an arguing point 
for the opponents of NAFTA, showed slightly positive or close to zero effects from NAFTA 
(Ojeda, Runsten, Paolis, & Kamel, 2000; USITC, 1997). Although, Mclaren & Hakobyan (2012) 
found that high school dropouts who became blue collar workers suffered from a lack of wage 
increases across industries.  
The analysis of Naanwaab and Yeboah (2012) showed that the US export of corn 
decreased to Canada while it increased to Mexico. They also found that the depreciation or 
appreciation of the currencies between the countries affected levels of trade. As the Canadian 
dollar appreciated against the US dollar, cotton exports from the US to Canada increased. The 
same effect was seen when the Mexican Peso appreciated to the US dollar and poultry exports 
from the US to Mexico increased. Increasing per capita incomes in Mexico and Canada also led 
to increased exports to those countries from the US. Dairy and wheat prices in the US decreased 
as a result of the increased competition from Canada. 
 
E. Single Countries Removing Barriers  
Lee, et al. (2008) examined the potential impact in Taiwan from reducing tariff escalation 
for agricultural products in the Doha Round Negotiations. They used a general equilibrium (GE) 
model to assess the impacts across the entire economy. Using 3 scenarios, the group studied the 
impact from different levels of tariff reduction as well as different levels of the escalated tariff 
wedge. The escalated tariff wedge is the difference in the tariffs for raw and processed products. 
The study estimated that larger reductions in tariffs would have a larger impact on the macro 
economy. While all the scenarios estimated positive impacts for total welfare, the employment 
and production in the domestic agricultural industries actually decreased. Also, the scenario that 
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measured the decrease in the tariff wedge showed a larger negative impact on the agricultural 
industries.  
Obi-Egbedi, Okoruwa, Yusuf and Kemisola (2013) performed a study to analyze the 
economic impacts of a large increase in tariffs versus a small decrease in tariffs in Nigeria. In the 
protectionist policy simulation, they simulated an 80% rice import tariff increase. In the 
liberalized policy they simulated a five percent decrease in the rice import tariff. Using a CGE 
model, the study aggregated data by the rice sector, other agriculture, oil and mining, 
manufacturing and services, urban north households, urban south households, rural north 
households, and rural south households. The study projected that even though the protectionist 
policy would increase welfare for rural households, the overall net welfare for the country would 
decrease. This welfare measurement included negative impacts on the oil, mining, manufacturing 
and service sectors. Negative effects were also estimated for government funds, GDP, and wage 
rates under the protectionist policy. The liberalized policy projected a larger increase in rice 
production as well as an increased wage rate compared to the protectionist policy.  
 
F. Rice Trade Specific Liberalization 
Mane and Wailes (2006) studied the different proposals that were offered for the Doha 
Round, and applied them for ex-ante analysis of trade liberalization scenarios for the major rice 
importing and exporting countries. They used the econometric Arkansas Global Rice Model. 
Two of the four proposals studied by Mane and Wailes are the US proposal and the EU proposal. 
As those are the two most relevant for this thesis, we only looked at the results for those 
scenarios. World prices in long grain rice increased in both scenarios. However, much of the 
increase came from reductions in import tariffs from countries that would be outside of the TTIP 
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agreement. The price for US No.2 Medium Grain (MG) rice (fob) in California, which was the 
world reference price for medium grain, was estimated to increase greatly. However, it was again 
largely due to policy changes in countries outside of the TTIP negotiations, notably northeast 
Asia including Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.  
Exports from long grain producing countries increased in all of the scenarios, except for 
the US and the EU. Decreases in support caused decreases in production for the US and EU. The 
medium grain export markets grew for the US and EU under the US proposal as TRQs were 
expanded for importing countries like Japan. However, in the EU model, medium grain exports 
for the US and EU were estimated to decrease. While this paper was somewhat irrelevant in this 
study due to the multilateral nature versus bilateral, its focus on rice trade liberalization had 
implications for results that may be anticipated in this study.  
Fuller, Fellin, and Salin (2003) performed an ex-ante study to project the impact of the 
liberalization of rice trade between the US and Mexico in the context of the NAFTA agreement. 
Before the liberalization, the tariff was relatively low for rough rice at ten percent, but there was 
a tariff escalation wedge with milled rice having a twenty percent tariff. The study was to be 
used as a tool for US millers to decide upon the opportunity for creating relationships with rice 
packers in Mexico. This was relative information because Mexican millers would become less 
competitive. In the NAFTA agreement, rice tariffs were to be phased out by straight line 
decreases. The rough rice tariff decreased by one percent per year and milled rice tariff by two 
percent per year. Both tariffs would reach zero in 10 years, or by 2003.  
The study projected that US producers had the largest welfare gains followed by the 
welfare gains of Mexican consumers. The US consumers and Mexican producers were projected 
to experience welfare losses. The projected total net welfare gain was substantial at $20 million 
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when compared with a total redistribution of $78 million in welfare. From 1997 to 2003 US rice 
exports to Mexico were projected to increase. Production and prices in the US were estimated to 
increase, while production and prices in Mexico estimated to decrease. Another important factor 
was the replacement of rough rice exports from the US with milled rice exports as a result of the 
reduction of the tariff escalation wedge for milled rice. The study also noted the importance of 
breaking apart the different levels of processing in which rice can be traded. The authors 
concluded that focusing on only one historically significant product, in this case rough rice, 
would give an inaccurate or incomplete result. Making it better to disaggregate and study the 
different rice products.  
 
G. EU and Mercosur Ex-Ante FTA Research 
Drogue and Ramos (2005) studied the ex-ante effects of the EU agricultural proposal for 
the EU and MERCOSUR4 free trade agreement (FTA) using the most recent EU proposal 
available during the study. The study modified the General Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) CGE 
model to include TRQs. They used seven regions and 14 sector aggregates in which all were 
agricultural except two that represented the manufacturing and services sectors. They faced a 
problem in modeling, in that there was not a specific quota already in place for MERCOSUR. To 
alleviate this problem they created “pseudo initial bilateral TRQs,” which created tariff rates 
slightly above a value of one. The results were surprising as the projected net global welfare 
decreased by $5 million. The estimation showed the EU as the loser and MERCOSUR the 
winner by way of receiving one-hundred percent of the rent transfer. Also noted in the estimation 
                                                 
4 This model defines Mercosur as a free trade area between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, 
and Paraguay. 
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was a competition for factors leading to large increases in meat production, in turn, creating 
losses in the services and manufacturing sectors.  
Weissleder, Adenauer, and Heckelei (2008) studied the potential effects of the bilateral 
trade agreement between the EU-25 and MERCOSUR5 using the Common Agriculture Policy 
Regional Impact (CAPRI) model. The CAPRI model is a partial comparative static equilibrium 
model known for its detailed accuracy of the EU markets. The study was designed to examine 
three scenarios of (1) unilateral partial liberalization for MERCOSUR products into the EU, (2) 
combining scenario one with the G20 proposal for multilateral liberalization, most importantly 
retaining some protection for sensitive products, and (3) full liberalization between the two 
regions. Also, the study examined the impact of using alternative elasticity values in the 
equilibrium model, in order to judge the accuracy and sensitivity of the quantitative assessment.  
The model accounted for many TRQs globally, with all of the important policies of the 
EU represented. The study used supply and demand elasticity values estimated by Cap, Brescia, 
& Lema (2006) as prior information in a constrained Bayesian framework (Weissleder et al., 
2008) in order calibrate the elasticity values for behavioral functions in the model.  There were 
also two baselines for MERCOSUR production. Production developments in the MERCOSUR 
countries can be dynamic and difficult to forecast. Therefore, one of the baselines was based on 
current production trends, while the other baseline assumed a dynamic development. The 
projections for both baselines were from Cap, Brescia, & Lema, (2006)  
In scenario 1 the estimated increase in exports from MERCOSUR into the EU were large 
and came from increased production in MERCOSUR. In scenario 2 with the addition of the G20 
                                                 
5 This model includes Venezuela in the free trade area. With Bolivia and Chile as 
associated members.  
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proposal, “preferential erosion” came into play and lessened the estimated gains for 
MERCOSUR. The G20 proposal simulation increased access for other countries into the EU, 
therefore decreasing the overall trade advantage for MERCOSUR. In scenario 3, large changes 
of trade patterns from MERCOSUR to the EU took place. These changes are generally a 
redirection of MERCOSUR exports, originally going to third countries, projected to go to the 
EU. The changes in trade were greatly related to the production baseline used. The results 
supported the idea that production levels will be more crucial for accurate estimations than the 
level of liberalization. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the Armington elasticity value shows 
the selection of elasticity values pivotal to the projected results. 
Burrell et al. (2011) conducted a study using the CAPRI model and the GLOBE model, a 
CGE model calibrated from GTAP data, for an ex-ante study of the MERCOSUR6 and EU free 
trade agreement. By using both of the models, they could analyze not only the full economic 
impact, but also a more detailed breakdown of the different agricultural commodities and 
regional applications within the EU. In each model the researchers created a reference scenario, a 
Doha round scenario in the reference year, a European offer scenario, a MERCOSUR request 
scenario, then each of the European and Mercosur scenarios combined with the Doha round 
implications.  
The results from all the simulations showed that, in general, the EU agricultural 
producers would have large decreases in economic welfare, and the Mercosur agricultural 
producers would have large gains in welfare. By using the GLOBE CGE model, the researchers 
projected larger increases in the manufacturing sector than the agricultural losses. Which would 
                                                 
6 This model defines MERCOSUR as including members Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay 
and Uruguay. 
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create a net increase in the EU GDP. Manufacturing in non-agrifood sectors of Mercosur was 
projected to experience losses. In the EU, agricultural workers were estimated to have larger 
losses per capita than the gains per capita for workers in the manufacturing sector. Distribution 
changes for different stakeholders in the model were reliant upon the assumption that the trading 
companies passed on the benefits to primary producers and consumers. There were also 
assumptions of who would capture the newly available rents from TRQ changes.  
 
H. Studies on TTIP 
Rickard, Gergaud and Hu (2014) simulated the ex-ante impact on wine markets in the US 
and EU with the removal of tariffs and regulations in the framework of the TTIP. The model 
simulated bilateral trade, but included three regions because they split the US into eastern and 
western regions to account for different regulations on distribution. The researchers observed 
that in the eastern US wine could not be sold in supermarkets, thereby decreasing demand. Also, 
the domestic policy examined in this paper for the EU was a reduction in the production support. 
The model analyzed four products which were EU bottled wine, EU bulk wine, US bottled wine, 
and US bulk wine. The bulk wine was also described as low quality wine, and the bottle wine as 
high quality wine. This disaggregation has reason because bulk wine and bottled wine have 
different tariff levels. The simulation was designed to examine the effects of domestic 
regulations for all regions as well as the impact of tariff reductions.  
The researchers found that the tariff reductions were the most influential factor impacting 
the wine market changes. However, the solutions were preliminary and dependent on the model 
parameter. Therefore, the authors chose to only highlight the direction of changes in prices, trade 
and welfare effects. When reducing tariffs on both sides by 50%, total demand increased for US 
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low quality wine and EU high quality wine, while decreasing for US high quality wine and EU 
low quality wine. Therefore, the model estimated that US bulk producers and EU bottled 
producers would have increased welfare, while the EU bulk producers and US bottled producers 
would have decreased welfare. Consumer and total surplus was estimated to increase in the EU 
and US.  
Francois et al. (2013) studied the potential impacts of removing tariffs and NTBs in the 
context of the TTIP. They estimated an agreement for tariffs and NTBs to create a GDP increase 
of €68.2-119.2 billion for the EU and €49.5-94.9 billion for the US. The estimated impact on 
GDP when removing tariffs alone is a €23.7 billion increase for the EU and €9.4 billion increase 
for the US. This showed a large amount of impact coming from the reduction of NTBs.  
 
I. Contribution of this study 
This study will contribute to the existing literature with a detailed analysis of the impacts 
to the global rice market in the context of trade liberalization of rice between the US and the EU. 
In the literature discussed above there are studies of multilateral liberalization of rice trade, rice 
trade in NAFTA, EU and MERCOSUR agricultural trade, a general equilibrium analysis of the 
TTIP, and a partial equilibrium study on wine in the TTIP. As, rice is important to specific 
regions in the US and the EU, this empirical analysis of the impact of the TTIP on rice will 
provide a decision making tool for participants in the rice market in both regions.  
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3. Method of Analysis and Data 
A. International Trade Theory 
The hypotheses for this study are based on theory presented in Koo & Kennedy (2005) 
showing the impact of a tariff removal on an agricultural commodity market. While this 
framework has some different assumptions than the RICEFLOW model used in this study, it is a 
useful tool for visual representation. The framework in Koo & Kennedy (2005) assumes 
homogenous goods and the law of one price. RICEFLOW does not assume either of these. In this 
case, the EU is an importing country and the US is an exporting country (Figure 7). The 
framework does not incorporate transaction costs in order to simplify the figure, however the 
RICEFLOW model does incorporate these costs.  
Autarky for a country’s domestic market is defined as the price of a good when there is 
not any trade.  Considering the difference of comparative advantages in different countries, trade 
allows for gaining higher social utility by increasing consumption and production. Countries 
with autarky prices lower than other countries can become exporters, and countries with autarky 
prices above other countries can become importers. The freer trade that is allowed, the more the 
different market prices will converge. Therefore, increasing production for countries that can 
become exporters, and increasing consumption for countries that can be come importers.  
The status quo of the US market is a price above the autarky price. This makes the US an 
exporting country with excess supply, where domestic supply is greater than domestic demand. 
The status-quo of EU market is that the domestic price is below the autarky price. Making the 
EU an importing country with excess demand, where the domestic supply is lower than the 
domestic demand. However, the EU has import tariffs which protect the rice producing industry. 
The import tariffs are represented by the red line in the figure below labeled price link (PL). It 
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increases prices in the domestic market, making supply greater and demand lower than it would 
be with free trade.  
By simulating TTIP, the price link will be removed. This will lower rice prices in the EU 
domestic market, causing domestic supply to decrease and domestic demand to increase. These 
changes caused by the EU domestic price change will cause a shift outwards in the excess 
demand curve. The shift outwards of the excess demand curve will cause an increase of price for 
the US market, causing an increase in supply and a decrease in demand. Therefore in the end, the 
EU price will decrease to meet the US price that increases.  
An agreement in the TTIP will also impact third countries, however most of the impacts 
will be marginal. As the price increases in the US, US rice will become less competitive in the 
markets where it currently exports. The countries that are importers from the US will see an 
increase in the price of imports from the US. The price of composite imports will be affected 
depending on the import share coming from the US. Then the increase in composite import 
prices will trigger substitution for domestically-produced rice according to the Armington 
elasticity. Exporters to the EU will lose market share in the EU. Depending on how large that 
market share loss impacts the overall domestic market, the domestic price of those exporters 
could decrease, or the new world import demand could cause an increase in price and 
production.  
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Figure 7: International Agricultural Trade Theory on Tariff Removal 
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B. RICEFLOW Model 
The RICEFLOW model is a multi-region, multi-product, spatial partial equilibrium 
model framework of the world rice market. The model is written in linearized form using the 
software GEMPACK®. 
The RICEFLOW model, which is used for this study, specifies the behavioral equations 
that are relevant according to neoclassical, marginal economic theory, instead of using 
optimization of transaction costs. The model maximizes utility for consumers and revenue for 
producers by solving a system of conditions.   
Production is specified as a two stage process in RICEFLOW. The two stages of 
production is basically used decrease the amount of parameter values that are necessary to 
provide, by not allowing substitution between primary and intermediate inputs. Therefore the 
elasticity of substitution at the second stage of production, where factors of production and 
inputs are combined, is equal to zero. In the first stage, the producer selects the optimal 
combination for factors of production, as well as the optimal combination of intermediate inputs. 
The behavior for both of these decisions is represented by their respective elasticity values of 
substitution.  
The model simply calibrates the equations to the data from a specific year or baseline 
market outcome from a detailed database. The consequence of the calibration method is that if a 
trade flow does not exist in the baseline data used for the simulation, the model will not create 
trade in the simulation. However, bilateral trade can expand and contract along with the other 
factors in the market. Just as trade flows cannot be created when it does not exist in the base 
data, production and consumption of products cannot be created either. They can only expand 
and contract. This characteristic is a main limitation of the framework.   
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Final consumption of rice is allowed only for milled rice. Demand for final consumption 
is represented by an isoelastic demand function accounting for own and cross price effects, 
income effects, and population growth. 
All markets are cleared using changes in price to make supply equal demand in each 
market. The markets include, final product, input markets, composite markets, etc.  
This model assumes heterogeneity aside from the 9 products in the model. Rice from 
different regions is considered to be different products based on the Armington model 
(Armington, 1969). The elasticity that accounts for the consumption preference of domestic 
products over imported is called the Armington model (Armington, 1969). The Armington model 
is specified through two elasticity values. One value for substitution between domestic and 
imported products, the higher tier, and another value for substitution between imported products 
from different sources, the lower tier. The higher the value, the more substitutability exists 
between the products. 
A final point of the model that is important for interpretation of the outcome is the 
constraint of the zero profit condition for primary and composite production. The zero profit 
condition normal profits. Therefore, all representations of price and revenue are equal to the cost 
for the producers.  
 
C. RICEFLOW Data 
The fact that the model is spatial means that it differentiates trade flows bilaterally into 
separate geographical entities. The model has 73 regions with 66 countries specified. The EU 
countries are aggregated, and countries that are not specified are aggregated into their respective 
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geographical regions. The regions are specified in Error! Reference source not found. on the 
following page.   
The model disaggregates rice by variety and level of processing. The varieties 
represented are long grain (LG), medium/short grain (MG), and fragrant rice (FR). The levels of 
processing are paddy (P), brown (husked) (B), and white (milled) (W). This disaggregation 
provides for 9 different products. The disaggregation of rice products is important in modeling 
the rice market because the tariffs are different for the different products. As we described 
earlier, the EU has tariff escalation for higher levels of processing in rice products. When these 
different products are aggregated into a single product, the results become inaccurate and 
unrepresentative of the market. 
The production data come primarily from the USDA Production, Supply, and Demand 
database (PS&D) and FAO. For some countries, extra consultations and estimations are needed 
to convert USDA and FAO production data to calendar year basis. Neither PS&D nor FAO data 
are disaggregated by rice type. The disaggregation process required data from external sources 
including USDA Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN) reports, national statistics 
from relevant countries, and personal communication with a network of collaborators.  
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Table 4: Regions included in RICEFLOW 2013 database 
Argentina Cuba Indonesia Paraguay Togo 
Australia Ecuador Iran Peru Turkey 
Bangladesh Egypt Iraq Philippines UAE 
Benin El Salvador Japan Russia Uruguay 
Bolivia EU Laos Saudi Arabia USA 
Brazil Gambia Liberia Senegal Venezuela 
Burkina Faso Ghana Malaysia Singapore Vietnam 
Cambodia Guatemala  Mali Sierra Leone Africa 
Cameroon Guinea Mexico South Korea Asia 
Canada Guinea Bissau Myanmar South Africa Caribbean 
Chile Guyana Nicaragua Sri Lanka Europe 
China Haiti Niger Suriname Middle East 
Colombia Honduras Nigeria Taiwan Oceania 
Costa Rica Hong Kong Pakistan Tanzania  
Côte D'Ivoire India Panama Thailand   
Notes: List of the countries included in the region aggregates 
EU: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Netherland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
United Kingdom 
Africa: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo, Congo D. Republic, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mayotte, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Reunion, Rwanda, Sao Tome, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, 
Western Sahara, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
Asia: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Brunei, Kazakhstan, DPR Korea, Kyrgyzstan, 
Maldives, Mongolia, Nepal, Seychelles, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
Caribbean: Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, Cayman 
Islands, Dominica, Dominican Republic, French Polynesia, Grenada, Guadeloupe, Jamaica, 
Martinique, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, St. Lucia, St. Kitts Nevis, St. Vincent, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Turks and Caicos Islands, Virgin Islands US 
Europe: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, Belarus, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia, 
Gibraltar, Iceland, Kosovo, Moldova, Norway, Romania, Serbia, Switzerland, Ukraine,  
Middle East: Bahrain, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, State of Palestine, 
Syria, Yemen 
Oceania: East Timor, Fiji Islands, Guam, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, New Caledonia, 
New Zealand, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Papua, Samoa, Tahiti, Timor-Leste, US Minor 
Outlying Islands, Vanuatu 
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Trade data comes primarily from exporter’s custom records and COMTRADE. The 
information provided by exporters is cross checked with that from importers to the extent 
allowed by data availability. The approach of focusing on trade data from exporters has the main 
advantage of allowing more frequent updates, since only 5 exporters account for over 80% of 
global rice trade. On the downside, this approach implicitly assumes that reporting from 
exporters is reliable.  
The export data from exporting country databases usually include the free on board 
(f.o.b.) price. However, the cif (cost of insurance and freight) prices needed to be calculated. In 
order to calculate the cif price, data needed to be obtained about transportation costs. This data 
were found on the website www.worldfreightrates.com and combined with knowledge from 
industry contacts.  
 
i. Elasticity Values 
Elasticities represent the behavior of producers and consumers. As mentioned earlier, 
exogenously set elasticity values are also one of the characteristics typically criticized about 
equilibrium models. Therefore in this section we will discuss the elasticity values and the 
reasoning behind them.  
For factors of production, the elasticity values of substitution are zero for paddy 
production and one for brown and white production. These elasticity values are used because 
land is absolutely essential for paddy production, and labor and capital cannot replace land. 
However, in the processing steps, labor and capital are assumed to be unitarily elastic. Unitary 
elasticity means that an increase of one unit in the ratio of capital price to labor price will lead to 
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an increase of one unit in the labor to capital use ratio (Tipper, 2011). This specifies that labor 
and capital are easily substituted for each other in the processing steps.  
The elasticity of substitution for intermediate inputs is assumed unitary across all rice 
products and regions. The intermediate inputs are fertilizer, pesticide, energy, water, seed, paddy 
rice, and brown rice (the last two represent the largest input cost for the milling activities). Land 
supply was assumed to be very inelastic in most regions with values varying from 0.01 to 0.25. 
The aspect of land being the binding factor is also represented in the supply elasticity 
values. All of the supply elasticity values of intermediate inputs are perfectly elastic for all 
products and regions. Labor and capital supplies are also perfectly elastic for all products and 
regions. The inelasticity of land supply shows that the supply of land changes slowly in respect 
to changes in the market (Appendix Table 1).  
The elasticity of transformation for factors of production controls the amount that factors 
of production change with respective changes in price. Land again is sluggish as the elasticity of 
transformation in only unitary (-1) for most regions. However, important for this study is an 
elasticity of land transformation at negative five in the EU (Appendix Table 1). The elasticity of 
transformation for labor and capital are near perfect (-1000).  
Calculating exact Armington elasticity values has proven to be very difficult according to 
the literature (Mcdaniel & Balistreri, 2002). Under different circumstances, accurate Armington 
elasticity values range mostly between one and ten. In this study we used a value for the 
Armington elasticity higher tier in the middle of this range with a value of five. The Armington 
elasticity value of the lower tier is usually twice the value of the upper tier (Mcdaniel & 
Balistreri, 2002), so we used a value of ten to differentiate between import sources .  
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The demand price elasticity values and income elasticity values are primarily from the 
Arkansas Global Rice Model (AGRM) as repeated by Food and Agricultural Policy Research 
Institute.  
 
D. Scenarios 
Two dynamic scenarios are generated for analysis of removing rice import tariffs 
between the US and EU. Each scenario will project rice market values from 2014 to 2027.  
The benchmark scenario simulates impacts of the projected changes in exogenous 
variables. All of the regions in the benchmark model will have exogenously specified shocks to 
population and consumer expenditures from 2014 to 2027. Also, regions with data available 
from the AGRM model will have shocks specified for changes in yield and stocks from 2014 to 
2024. From 2025 to 2027 the stocks are held constant and yields change at the same rate as 2024. 
The shock for these variables is set exogenously and all other exogenous variables are held 
constant. The shock values for population and consumer expenditures are from data obtained 
from IHS Global Insight Inc7. The original data are projections of population and real GDP 
growth figures. We use the GDP growth figures as a representative of the change in consumer 
expenditures, because accurate consumer expenditure values are difficult to obtain.  
The impact scenario builds upon the benchmark by adding the removal of all import 
tariffs for rice trade between the US and the EU. Tariff elimination is assumed to linear and over 
10 years starting in 2017. We also assume in this study that all existing preferences granted by 
                                                 
7 The data is from the October 2014 updated forecasts by the private company IHS 
Global Insight. 
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the EU (as discussed in Overview of Current Barriers above) are to be honored despite the 
implementation of TTIP. 
4. Results 
A. Impacts to the US Market 
i. US Production 
Table 5: Projected US Production in 2027 
Product Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Change
Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
LGP 5,125 5,252 2% 127 2,331,308 2,430,347 4% 99,038
MGP 2,386 2,419 1% 33 1,218,541 1,257,293 3% 38,753
FRP 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
LGB 3,723 3,906 5% 183 1,718,622 1,834,302 7% 115,681
MGB 2,386 2,419 1% 33 1,234,494 1,273,756 3% 39,261
FRB 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
LGW 3,634 3,819 5% 186 1,766,679 1,888,990 7% 122,310
MGW 2,167 2,215 2% 47 1,172,756 1,219,565 4% 46,809
FRW 5 5 0% 0 7,360 7,365 0% 5
Projected U.S. Production in 2027
Volume (1000MT milled equivalent) Value at Market Price ($1000)
 
 The results of this simulation suggest that rice trade liberalization between the US and the 
EU will have an important impact on the US long grain rice industry (Table 5). Long grain paddy 
production is estimated to increase by 127 thousand metric tons (tmt) or 2% in 2027 as a result of 
TTIP. This is encouraged by increases in aggregate demand that pushes market prices for long 
grain higher by 1.7% in the scenario. The market value of long grain paddy output is estimated to 
be greater in the scenario by roughly USD 99 million or 4%. 
The volume of milled long grain rice output in the US is also estimated to be greater in 
the scenario by approximately 186 tmt or 5%. Making the value of the US milling output greater 
by USD 122 million in 2027 and helping sustain the investments in the US milling sector. 
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The differences between the 2027 estimations of long grain production vary by degree of 
processing, with the larger difference for products that are further processed. In a milled basis, 
the output is similarly greater in the scenario for long grain brown (LGB) and long grain white 
(LGW) at about 183 and 186 tmt respectively. While paddy production is only about 127 tmt 
greater in the scenario on a milled basis. On a percentage basis, LGB and LGW production is 
about 5% greater, while LGP production is only 2% greater.  
Rice trade liberalization between the US and the EU is expected to have smaller but still 
notable impacts on the US medium grain sector (Table 5). Medium grain paddy (MGP) and 
brown (MGB) production are expected to be greater in the scenario by 1% in 2027. Medium 
grain white (MGW) production in the scenario is expected to be greater by 2% in 2027.  
Production values for MGP and MGW are estimated to be greater in the scenario by USD 
39 million and USD 46 million respectively in 2027. These production value increases are also 
driven by an increase in market value of 1.7%.  
The decreased price of US rice in the EU market, causes an increase in demand for US 
rice. This in turn increases the price of US rice which causes an increase of production. Also, in 
this study, it is assumed the price elasticity for land in Europe is lower than most regions, 
because according to historical figures it is not likely the rice area will increase greatly. Finally, 
it is assumed that EU imports from Egypt will hold constant at the 2015 TRQ level in current EU 
policy. 
Remembering that these values are projections in to the future, it is useful to look at the 
net present value (NPV) of the projected differences in production. The impact of trade reform 
from 2017 to 2027 generate differences in the projected production values year to year. 
Therefore, it is worth looking at the future stream in the difference of production value, as well 
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as the accumulated NPV of the years combined. This analysis uses a five percent discount rate 
and utilizes 2013 as the base year. 
Figure 8: NPV of Projection Difference for Production Value in the US 
 
The difference between the NPV of the projected production value of the scenario and the 
benchmark increases as tariffs are reduced in a straight line through the implementation of the 
policy beginning in 2017. The accumulated NPV from the implementation of trade liberalization 
evaluated in this study is equal to USD 1.1 billion in 2013 USD.  
 
ii. US Consumption 
Table 6: Projected US Consumption in 2027 
Product
Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
LGW 2,553 2,553 -0.01% -0.27 5,187,450 5,265,324 1.5% 77,874
MGW 1,282 1,282 -0.01% -0.17 693,750 705,841 1.7% 12,091
FRW 594 594 0.01% 0.05 833,158 833,354 0.0% 196
US Volume of Final Consumption (1000MTs) US Value of Final Consumption ($1000s)
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The volume of final US consumption of LGW and MGW is estimated to be marginally 
lower in 2027 as a result of TTIP. FRW consumption is estimated to be marginally greater in the 
scenario in 2027 as some consumers substitute it for LGW and MGW. Consumer prices for long 
grain and medium grain rice increase by 1.5% and 1.7% respectively, leading to increases in the 
value of final consumption of USD 90 million for all rice products. 
 
iii. US Imports 
Table 7: Projected US Imports in 2027 
Product Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
LGP 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
MGP 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
FRP 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
LGB 15 17.1 14% 2.2 0 0 0% 0
MGB 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
FRB 6.0 6.0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
LGW 137 151 10% 13.7 10.3 17.1 67% 6.9
MGW 0.3 0.4 38% 0.1 0.3 0.4 41% 0.1
FRW 588 588 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
2% 15.7 66% 7.0
10% 15.7 67% 6.9
US Total Imports (1000MT) US Imports From EU (1000MT)
Total Milled Equivalent Total Milled Equivalent
LG Milled Equivalent LG Milled Equivalent  
The estimated volume of total milled equivalent rice imported into the US in 2027 is 2% 
greater in the scenario than in the benchmark. This number is slightly misrepresentative of the 
difference because it includes FRW imports, which are estimated in the scenario to be unchanged 
from the benchmark. The estimated LG milled equivalent of US imports are greater in the 
scenario by 10% or 15.7 tmt. The volume of US imports for LGW is estimated to be 10% or 13.7 
tmt greater in the scenario in 2027. In particular, about one-half of the increase in US LGW 
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imports (6.9 tmt) comes from the EU. Imports of long grain from other countries such as India, 
Thailand and Vietnam also increase as a result of the scenario.  
The EU is projected to be the only exporter of MGW to the US in both the benchmark 
and the scenario in 2027. This could be an over estimation as the original data from 2013 is from 
a drought year in Egypt, in which the production and exports from Egypt were low. For this 
reason, as demand pressure increases for Egypt in the model, the only regions that Egypt 
maintain notable exports to are the EU and Africa. The exports to the EU are held exogenous at 
the 2015 TRQ level as mentioned above. 
 
iv. US Exports 
Table 8: Projected US Exports in 2027 
Product Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
LGP 1975 1896 -4% -79 0 0 0% 0
MGP 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
FRP 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
LGB 62 60 -4% -2 4 4 0% 0
MGB 211 195 -8% -17 1 1 0% 0
FRB 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
LGW 1246 1456 17% 210 18 320 1730% 303
MGW 885 933 5% 48 21 94 342% 72
FRW 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
4.9% 185 970% 375
US Total Exports (1000MT) US Exports to EU (1000MT)
Total Milled Equivalent Total Milled Equivalent  
As expected there is a large difference in estimated US exports as a result of the TTIP 
policy. Total US rice exports in 2027 in milled equivalent volume are estimated to be greater in 
the scenario by 4.9% or 185 tmt. The increased volume comes from a large expansion in LGW 
and MGW rice exports, while paddy and brown exports decreased. Total US LGW export 
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estimates in 2027 are 17% or 210 tmt greater in the scenario. Total MGW export estimates in 
2027 are 5% or 48 tmt greater in the scenario. 
The larger US export volumes estimated in the scenario are driven by increased exports 
to the EU, as expected. US LGW exports to the EU in 2027 are estimated to be higher by 1,730% 
or 303 tmt in the scenario and MGW exports to the EU are estimated to be 342% or 72 tmt 
greater in the scenario. However, the MGW exports to the EU could be over-estimated due to the 
simplification in modeling the Egyptian market that was mentioned in the US imports section.  
Total US exports of LGW in 2027 are estimated to be greater by 210 tmt in the scenario. 
However, US exports of LGW to the EU are estimated to be greater by 303 tmt. Meaning that 
benchmark bilateral trade flows of rice to other countries decrease. The impact on US exports of 
LGW to third countries is given in   
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Table 9 and discussed below. The same situation of changing export flows to expand US 
MGW also occurred with US MGW. The estimated exports are 48 tmt greater in the scenario 
total MGW exports, but US MGW exports increased by 72 tmt. Meaning there are 24 tmt of US 
MGW exports not going to their previous other destinations. This impact on benchmark flows is 
presented in Table 11Table 10 and discussed below.  
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Table 9: Projected US LGW Export Destinations in 2027 
Region Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
EU 18 320 1730% 303.0
Haiti 396 374 -5% -21.7
Canada 156 151 -3% -5.0
Mexico 150 142 -6% -8.8
Iran 100 89 -11% -11.5
Saudi Arabia 85 75 -11% -9.6
Ghana 79 69 -12% -9.7
Colombia 49 46 -7% -3.3
Caribean 40 35 -12% -4.8
Iraq 36 31 -14% -4.9
Pakistan 27 25 -7% -2.0
Panama 23 20 -12% -2.7
Honduras 17 16 -3% -0.5
Costa Rica 12 10 -12% -1.4
Other 58 52 -11% -6.7
Total (No EU) 1228 1135 -8% -92.6
Total 1246 1456 17% 210.4
LGW US Export Destinations (1000MT)
 
Other: Liberia, Guatemala, Middle East, Benin, Philippines, Africa, El Salvador, Guinea, Mali, 
Sri Lanka, Oceania, Nicaragua, Japan, UAE, India, Cameroon, Australia, Cambodia, Peru, Laos, 
South Africa, Malaysia, Tanzania, Hong Kong, Europe, Nigeria, Singapore, Chile, Indonesia, 
South Korea, Egypt, Suriname, Vietnam, Venezuela, Thailand, Asia, Russia, Taiwan 
 
The table above includes all trade partners that imported at least 10 tmt of US LGW in 
2013 as well as a category for other regions which imported less than 10 tmt. The largest 
estimated decrease in trade flows is to Haiti, a decrease of 21.7 tmt. This list of trade partners 
shows where the rice is diverted from in order to expand exports of US LGW to the EU.  
Much of the estimated increase of LGW exports comes from an estimated decrease in 
LGP exports. Exports for LGP in 2027 are 79 tmt or 4% lower in the scenario. Destinations that 
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would be impacted by this estimated change in bilateral trade flows are reported in Table 10 and 
discussed below. 
Table 10: Projected US LGP Export Destinations in 2027 
Region Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
Venezuela 331 301 -9.0% -29.8
Mexico 944 929 -1.6% -15.3
Turkey 102 92 -9.8% -10.0
Costa Rica 100 92 -8.2% -8.2
Africa 98 91 -7.2% -7.0
Guatemala 98 94 -3.3% -3.3
Panama 27 26 -5.6% -1.5
Honduras 164 162 -0.8% -1.3
Nicaragua 10 8 -14.1% -1.3
El Salvador 97 96 -1.1% -1.1
Colombia 4 4 -5.4% -0.2
Other 1.8 1.7 -9% -0.2
LGP US Export Destinations (1000MT)
 
Other: United Arab Emirates, Canada, Brazil, Caribbean, EU, Haiti, Oceania, Australia, Middle 
East 
The largest nominal decreases of US LGP imports are in Venezuela, Mexico, and Turkey. 
However, the largest percentage decreases are Nicaragua, Turkey and Venezuela. The impact 
that TTIP rice trade liberalization has on the importing countries is a result of higher border 
prices. When the export price changes for the U.S., the import markets with lower demand or 
more negative price demand elasticity values, decrease the most. Another factor that impacts the 
demand for these import levels is the amount of domestic production in comparison to the 
amount of imports. If a country has the ability to increase production due to the increased price, 
then their imports are reduced further than a country that must import to meet domestic demand.  
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Table 11: Projected US MGW Export Destinations in 2027 
Region Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
EU 21 94 341.7% 72.5
Middle East 211 210 -0.5% -1.0
South Korea 54 48 -12.2% -6.7
Africa 28 25 -9.7% -2.7
Turkey 27 21 -20.3% -5.4
Hong Kong 18 16 -9.5% -1.7
Australia 15 14 -8.5% -1.3
Taiwan 10 9 -9.7% -0.9
Russia 8 6 -15.6% -1.2
Europe 7 5 -32.8% -2.4
Other 222 221 -0.5% -1.1
Total (No EU) 600 576 -4% -24.4
Total 621 669 8% 48.0
MGW US Export Destinations (1000MT)
 
Other: Chile, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Oceania, United Arab Emirates, Cote d’Ivoire, Pakistan, 
Asia, Singapore, Brazil, Mexico, Thailand, Tanzania, Malaysia, Indonesia, Liberia, South Africa, 
China, Benin, Colombia, Ghana, Senegal, Haiti, Cameroon, Cambodia, Caribbean, Costa Rica, 
India, Nicaragua, Peru, Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, Guatamala, El Salvador, Uruguay, Sri 
Lanka, Vietnam, Guinea, Philippines, Nigeria, Suriname, Togo 
Table 11 represents US trade partners with an estimated difference of MGW imports 
greater than 0.5 tmt, as well as an aggregate of other importers of US MGW. The two largest 
differences in trade flows of US MGW exports are to South Korea and Turkey. The scenario 
estimates 6.7 tmt or 12% less exports to South Korea and 5.4 tmt or 20.3% less exports to 
Turkey.  
Japan is missing from this table because in a preliminary run of the model, there was a 
large decrease in US MGW exports to Japan. This did not seem reasonable because in the base 
data from 2013 there were 278 tmt of US MGW exported to Japan. This value was low 
historically and for it to decrease more seemed unrealistic. Especially given the geographical 
relation of Japan to California where most of the MGW is produced in the US. To handle this 
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issue, US MGW exports to Japan are held exogenous starting in 2017, the first year the TTIP 
policy is implemented. 
 
B. Impacts to the EU Market 
i. EU Production 
Table 12: Projected EU Production in 2027 
Product
Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
LGP 724 682 -5.8% -42 363,809 327,652 -9.9% -36,157
MGP 1,648 1,591 -3.4% -56 949,743 877,049 -7.7% -72,695
FRP 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0% 0
LGB 728 686 -5.9% -43 377,473 339,888 -10.0% -37,585
MGB 1,648 1,591 -3.4% -56 960,713 887,178 -7.7% -73,534
FRB 0 0 0.0% 0 0 0 0.0% 0
LGW 840 757 -9.9% -83 526,127 456,613 -13.2% -69,514
MGW 1636 1579 -3.4% -56 997,679 921,168 -7.7% -76,511
FRW 60 60 -0.5% -0.3 66,974 66,655 -0.5% -319
E.U. Production
EU Production(1000MT milled equivalent) Value at Market Price ($1000)
 
Note: The exchange rate used is $1 is equal to €0.7532 
The results of the bilateral trade liberalization scenario between the US and EU reflect a 
reduction of production in the EU rice sector. The projections for EU production in 2027 are 
lower in the scenario for all levels of processing for long grain and medium grain rice varieties.  
The negative impacts on LGW and MGW are greater as tariff escalation is removed. The 
quantity decrease for LGB is almost equal to LGP at 43 tmt and 42 tmt, respectively. The 2027 
production value for LGP is estimated to be about USD 36 million lower in the scenario than the 
benchmark.  
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The estimation for LGW production in 2027 in the scenario is 9.9% or 83 tmt lower than 
the benchmark, equating to loss in value of production of 13.2% or almost USD 70 million. 
These large negative impacts in LGW and MGW rice production show the negative impact on 
the EU rice milling industry. Again, this impact is due to removing the tariff escalation. Current 
protection favors the EU milling industry to import paddy and brown rice and then mill it within 
the EU. As the escalation is reduced and ultimately eliminated, the milling industry loses its 
implicit subsidy and more white rice is projected to be imported rather than the paddy and brown 
rice.  
Medium grain production is estimated to be 3.4% lower for all levels of processing. 
While rice trade liberalization also erodes tariff escalation in the medium grain market, the EU 
doesn’t import a notable amount of MGP or MGB to process. In 2013, the EU imported less than 
1 tmt of MGB, which was from the US. The increased competition of US MGW in the EU 
market causes a decrease in the price. With the decrease in price, less MGP is estimated to be 
produced. The lower production of paddy carried through to reduce brown and white rice 
production. The estimated value of 2027 MGP production in the scenario is lower by 7.7% or 
almost USD 73 million, and the estimated value of MGW production loss is also 7.7% but 
valued greater at USD 76.5 million. These values predict a much greater impact on the EU 
medium grain market than the US medium grain market as percentage change. Even in nominal 
terms the EU MGW production value is estimated to be USD 76.5 million lower in the scenario, 
while US MGW production value is only estimated to be USD 46.8 million greater. 
he model shows that in the first few years of the policy implementation, LGP production 
actually increases (Figure 109). This is surprising because the increased competition to the EU 
market should decrease the price at all phases of production. The price decrease would be 
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expected to cause a decrease in production in the EU. After analysis, it is found that the quickly 
declining MGP production is substituted with LGP production in the first several years of 
liberalization. This can be seen in Figure 10 below. 
Figure 9: Timeline of EU Paddy Rice Production 
 
Source: Based on data from this study 
Figure 10: Timeline of Production Difference between Benchmark and Scenario 
 
Source: Based on data from this study 
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ii. EU Consumption 
Table 13: Projected EU Consumption in 2027 
Product
Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
LGW 1,468 1,481 0.92 13 1,816,875 1,729,444 -5% -87,430
MGW 1,700 1,713 0.74 13 4,058,026 3,883,345 -4% -174,680
FRW 864 860 -0.56 -4.82 946,772 941,947 -1% -4,825
EU Volume of Final Consumption (1000MTs) EU Value of Final Consumption ($1000s)
 The estimated volume of consumption in the scenario is marginally greater for LGW and 
MGW due to lower domestic prices. FRW consumption is estimated to be lower in the scenario, 
due to the substitution effect by consumers switching to LGW and MGW rice that becomes less 
expensive. The 2027 retail prices of final consumption for LGW and MGW are estimated to be 
6% and 5% lower in the scenario, respectively. The large difference of prices estimated in the 
scenario compared to the benchmark, creates savings for EU consumers. Where they are 
projected to ultimately pay less to consume more. The value of consumption in 2027 for LGW is 
estimated to be 5% or USD 87.4 million lower and MGW is estimated to be 4% or USD 174.7 
million lower in the scenario. FRW value of consumption in 2027 is estimated to be almost 1% 
or USD 5 million lower in the scenario.  
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iii. EU Imports 
Table 14: Projected EU Imports in 2027 
Product Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
LGP 7 7 0% -0.03 0.10 0.07 -27% -0.03
MGP 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
FRP 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
LGB 138 100 -28% -38 4 3.93 3% 0.11
MGB 0.80 0.76 -5% -0.04 0.80 0.76 -5% -0.04
FRB 70 69 -1% -0.36 0 0 0% 0
LGW 727 854 17% 127 18 320 1730% 303
MGW 102 175 71% 72 21 94 342% 72
FRW 804 800 -1% -5 0 0 0% 0
9% 161.3 877% 375.5
11% 93.7 1450% 303.1
70% 72.4 330% 72.4
EU Total Imports (1000MT) EU Imports From US (1000MT)
MG Milled Equivalent MG Milled Equivalent
Total Milled Equivalent Total Milled Equivalent
LG Milled Equivalent LG Milled Equivalent
 
The scenario results for total EU imports of long grain and medium grain products are 
substantial in 2027. The values are driven by large increases of LGW and MGW imports, while 
brown rice imports declined. These results are due to the elimination of the tariff escalation.  
Under the scenario, total imports of LGW are larger and imports of LGW from the US 
are much larger. Total imports of LGW are greater by 17% or 127 tmt, and LGW imports from 
the US are 1,730% or 303 tmt greater in the scenario. Total 2027 LGB imports to the EU are 
estimated to be 28% or 38 tmt less in the scenario. As the US processed rice products increase in 
competitiveness in the EU markets, the EU stops importing raw materials and imports the milled 
rice.  
The EU imported a negligible amount of MGB in 2013, less than 1 tmt. Even though the 
scenario estimates a 5% reduction MGB imports, that value was only 0.04 tmt. However, MGW 
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imports are projected to be much greater in the scenario to the amount of 72 tmt, a 71% increase. 
This increase of imports is in line with the decrease in production.  
Figure 11: Timeline of Projected Difference of Imports in Benchmark and Scenario  
  
Source: Based on data from this study 
The MGW import values increase almost linearly. A straight line increase is expected, 
because of the straight line reduction of import tariffs. Considering the import tariffs are the only 
changing variable it would be expected that the other affected variables would change linearly as 
well. The nonlinear expansion of LGW and LGB was not expected, and it reflects the 
substitution of LGP production in the EU for MGP production, which delays the upward trend in 
LGW imports.  
In this analysis it is important to remove the values for intra-EU trade from the results. 
By removing those values from the overall trade, the EU is treated as a single region or trading 
entity. The change in trade among the EU members was a direct result of the decrease in 
production (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12: EU Import Origin Projections in 2027 
 
Imports of LGW from the US increases by 303 tmt, which is 176 tmt greater than the 
total increase of import volume to the EU. This implies that there are 176 tmt of EU imports 
coming from the US that previously came from another country source. The situation is not 
similar for MGW because imports from Egypt are held constant and the US is the only other 
source of imports for MGW. The next section analyzes what countries were affected by these 
new trade flows of LGW.  
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Table 15: Projected EU LGW Import Origination 
Region Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
Intra-EU 450 356 -21% -94
USA 18 320 1730% 303
India 157 86 -45% -70
Thailand 93 52 -45% -42
Vietnam 64 35 -45% -28
Brazil 33 18 -45% -15
Uruguay 28 15 -44% -12
Pakistan 11 6 -45% -5
Paraguay 7 4 -44% -3
Argentina 1.7 1.0 -45% -0.8
Ecuador 0.0007 0.0004 -45% -0.0003
EU LGW Import Originiation (1000MT)
 
Note: Cambodia, Myanmar, Tanzania, Suriname, and Guyana are excluded from the table 
because their trade flows were held exogenous in the model in order to create more realistic 
results 
The percent change in imports from other countries is remarkably similar with all third 
countries losing 44% or 45% (Table 15: Projected EU LGW Import Origination). The largest 
projected decreases in trade flows in 2027 for LGW imported into the EU are from India, 
Thailand, Vietnam, Brazil, and Uruguay. The largest of which is India with a decrease of exports 
to the EU equal to 70 tmt. Thailand and Vietnam also lose large shares of the market with 
decreases of 42 tmt and 28 tmt, respectively. Brazil and Uruguay both decrease exports to the EU 
by 9.2 tmt and 9.7 tmt respectively. Intra-EU trade decreases as a result of the lower estimated 
production. The decreased share of the European market is spread evenly across the different 
origins because of how the RICEFLOW model works. The newly created preferential market 
access was treated as a relative change in advantage, rather than optimizing market efficiency. 
Since these origins have similar market access, the relative decreases are also similar.  
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iv. EU Exports 
Table 16: Projected EU Exports in 2027 
Product Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Difference
LGP 1 1 62% 0 0 0 0% 0
MGP 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
FRP 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
LGB 1 2 36% 0 0 0 85% 0
MGB 1 1 11% 0 0 0 0% 0
FRB 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
LGW 102 140 36% 37 10 17 67% 7
MGW 34 46 37% 12 0 0 41% 0
FRW 0 0 0% 0 0 0 0% 0
36.4% 51 66% 7
EU Total Exports (1000MT) EU Exports to US (1000MT)
Total Milled Equivalent Total Milled Equivalent  
 Surprisingly, EU exports in 2027 are actually projected to be greater in the scenario. 
LGW exports in 2027 are projected to be 36% or 37 tmt greater in the scenario, and MGW 
exports are projected to be 37% or 12 tmt greater in the scenario. LGW exports in 2027 are 
projected to be 67% or 7 tmt greater in the scenario.  
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Table 17: Projected EU LGW Export Destinations in 2027 
Region Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Differnce
Turkey 50.4 63.0 25% 12.7
Europe 20.4 28.5 39% 8.0
US 10.3 17.1 67% 6.9
Middle East 9.2 13.3 44% 4.1
Africa 3.1 4.5 45% 1.4
Brazil 2.7 3.8 41% 1.1
Australia 2.5 3.5 41% 1.0
Canada 2.0 3.3 63% 1.3
Other 1.8 2.6 44% 0.8
LGW EU Export by Destinations (1000MT)
 
Regions included in other in order of benchmark exports greatest to least: Russia, Cuba, Saudi 
Arabia, Oceania, India, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, South Africa, Caribbean, Singapore, Hong 
Kong, China, Colombia, Panama, Philippines, Chile, Peru, Senegal, Asia, Mexico, Taiwan, 
Japan, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela, Paraguay, Benin, Bangladesh 
Table 17 includes all the regions that are projected to import more than 1 tmt of LGW 
from Europe in 2027 of the benchmark. Turkey, Europe, US and the Middle East are the regions 
that are projected to be the destinations for the largest increase in exports of LGW from the EU. 
It would be expected that the US has the largest relative increase at 67% because of the 
decreasing import tariffs.  
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Table 18: Projected EU MGW Export Destinations in 2027 
 
 Error! Reference source not found. shows all of the countries that import MGW from 
the EU in 2027 of the benchmark. Turkey, Europe, and Russia have the largest increases of EU 
MGW export share. Turkey imports an additional 8 tmt, Europe imports an additional 2.4 tmt, 
and Russia imports an additional 1.4 tmt.  
Europe becomes more competitive in the global market, because the domestic price 
decreases. With the domestic price decrease, FOB price also decreases. Therefore, the EU is able 
to increase exports to third countries.  
 
C. Impacts on Third Country Markets 
i. Third Country Production 
This section provides a discussion of the potential impacts on third countries from the 
TTIP proposed agreement. The countries reported are chosen based on the level of trade with the 
US and the EU. The countries with the largest level of bilateral trade flow differences between 
the scenario and benchmark are represented in this group. The countries are Brazil, Ghana, Haiti, 
India, Mexico, South Korea, Venezuela, and Vietnam.  
Region Benchmark Scenario
Percent 
Difference
Nominal 
Differnce
Turkey 18.7 26.7 43% 8.0
Europe 11.6 14.0 21% 2.4
Russia 2.7 4.2 53% 1.4
Australia 0.68 1.12 65% 0.4
USA 0.27 0.38 41% 0.11
Brazil 0.024 0.041 72% 0.02
Canada 0.010 0.018 81% 0.008
Middle East 0.003 0.006 81% 0.003
MGW EU Export by Destinations (1000MT)
63 
 
Table 19: Projected Difference in Producer Price in 2027 
Brazil Ghana Haiti India Mexico South Korea Venezuela Vietnam
LGP -0.001% 0.13% 0.58% 0.05% 0.77% 0% 0.47% 0.02%
MGP 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.04% 0% 0%
FRP 0% 0% 0% 0.07% 0% 0.00% 0% 0.03%
Producer Price
 
It was hypothesized that production price would increase for importing countries due to 
the decrease in supply coming from the US. This hypothesis could not be rejected for Ghana, 
Haiti, Mexico South Korea, and Venezuela in this analysis.  
Table 20: Projected Difference in Production in 2027 
Brazil Ghana Haiti India Mexico South Korea Venezuela Vietnam
LGP -0.01% 0.26% 2.24% 0.01% 2.78% 0% 0.64% 0.05%
MGP 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.11% 0% 0%
FRP 0% 0% 0% -0.08% 0% 0% 0% -0.04%
LGB -0.22% 0.26% 2.24% 0.01% -1.02% 0% -0.14% 0.05%
MGB 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.11% 0% 0%
FRB 0% 0% 0% -0.08% 0% 0% 0% -0.04%
LGW -0.09% 0.27% 2.24% 0.02% -1.03% 0.05% -0.14% 0.06%
MGW -2.21% -0.37% -0.12% -0.13% -0.06% 0.02% -0.16% -0.33%
FRW 0% 0% 0% -0.08% 0% 0% 0% -0.04%
Difference in Production Volume 2027
 
It was expected that production projections would be greater in the countries that had 
greater projected producer prices. Haiti and Mexico have the most substantial increases in paddy 
production. While the greater paddy production in Haiti carries fully through the milling sector, 
Mexico has lower projected milling volumes in the scenario than in the benchmark. This 
projection was expected, because Mexico imported a large amount of US paddy rice in 2013 that 
it then milled. While the projected volume of production is lower in Mexico’s milling sector, the 
value of the LGW estimated production is actually 0.4% or USD 2.4 million greater due to price 
increases. Also, the value of production in Haiti is projected to be about 3% greater at all milling 
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levels which in nominal figures is about USD 1.5 million for LGP production and USD 1.6 
million for LGW production. As for the apparent negative effect on Brazil MGW, there was an 
extremely marginal amount of production in Brazil in 2013, and this negative amount of change 
is also extremely marginal.  
 
ii. Third Country Consumption 
The trade agreement would impact the level of consumption of rice in third countries due 
to a global rice price increase. An increase of price in third countries could lead to a reduction in 
food security and would be a negative consumer impact from this trade agreement, however 
producers of rice in third countries would benefit as shown above for Mexico and Haiti. 
Table 21: Projected Difference in Retail Price of Consumption in 2027 
Brazil Ghana Haiti India Mexico South Korea Venezuela Vietnam
Weighted Average -0.01% 0.15% 1.04% 0.05% 1.34% 0.07% 0.61% 0.02%
LGW -0.01% 0.17% 1.03% 0.05% 1.33% 0.01% 0.60% 0.02%
MGW 1.28% 1.52% 1.67% 1.67% 1.72% 0.07% 1.72% 1.64%
FRW 0.02% 0.01% 0.00% 0.07% 0.01% 0.01% 0.07% 0.03%
Consumer Price at Retail
 
The regions that are impacted the greatest are, again, Haiti and Mexico. The percent 
changes of price in the disaggregated rows are deceiving because the volume of consumption can 
be very low, therefore a higher percentage change can still mean very marginal impacts on the 
market. This is especially true for MGW in this instance, except for South Korea. In order to 
show which values are significant, we added the weighted average row above which is price 
change weighted by volume of consumption. Haiti and Mexico are projected to have increases in 
price over one percent at retail value. However, Table 22: Projected Difference in Consumption 
Volume in 2027shows that the projected difference in consumption volumes is marginal. That 
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does not mean the change in price would not affect household budgets. It just means that rice is 
own-price inelastic.  
Brazil has a marginal decrease in price. This is a result of an overall decrease in brown 
and white rice exports. Paddy rice exports increased. Total exports decreased by 1.33 tmt, 
causing an increase of supply in the domestic market and a decrease in price. 
Table 22: Projected Difference in Consumption Volume in 2027 
Brazil Ghana Haiti India Mexico South Korea Venezuela Vietnam
Weighted Average 0.03% 0.04% -0.03% 0.08% -0.05% -0.04% -0.01% 0.08%
LGW 0.033% 0.03% -0.03% 0.08% -0.04% 0.00% -0.01% 0.08%
MGW -0.126% -0.22% -0.07% -0.33% -0.07% -0.04% -0.11% -0.32%
FRW 0.030% 0.06% 0.03% 0.07% 0.04% 0.00% 0.04% 0.08%
Consumption Volume
  
 
5. Conclusion  
A. Summary 
This study developed estimates of the potential global market impacts of the 
liberalization of rice bilateral trade between the EU and US under the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP). The results were expected to show an increase of production in 
the US of paddy rice and output in the milling sector. A decrease of production of paddy rice and 
milled output in the milling sector was expected in the EU. These results were expected because 
the US is a more competitive producer of rice than the EU, the US is a top five exporter of rice, 
the US has the capacity to increase production acres, and the EU has greater protection on rice 
than the US, in the form of import tariffs. Therefore, when both regions remove all tariffs, the 
relative competitiveness of US rice in the EU market increases greater than the relative 
competitiveness of EU rice increases in the US market. 
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Along with the impacts to the volume of production in each region, other relative market 
values were also expected to be different in the scenario projections. The increased imports from 
the US in the EU rice market was expected to cause a decrease in prices for rice at every stage in 
the market, and an increase in the prices in the US market driven by the increased demand. US 
rice exports to the EU were expected to increase and total rice exports from the US were 
expected to increase. The increase in bilateral trade between the US and the EU was expected to 
cause a change in bilateral trade flows that the two regions had with third region trading partners. 
US exports to third countries were expected to decrease and EU imports from third countries 
were expected to decrease. These bilateral trade flow altering impacts would affect price and 
production in the third countries, but only marginally.  
The results indicate that our hypotheses were not rejected. The analysis compared the 
projections of the benchmark to the projections of the scenario for the year 2027. The reason for 
using projection for 2027 in our analysis, was that it was the year the tariffs are assumed to be 
reduced to zero. 
US paddy production in 2027 was estimated to be greater by two percent in the scenario 
compared to the benchmark. White production was estimated to be four percent greater in the 
scenario. EU paddy production was estimated to be four percent less in the scenario and EU 
white rice production was estimated to be 5.5% less in the scenario. Price in the US increased for 
production and consumption, while price in the EU decreased for production and consumption. 
US exports to the EU as well as total US exports increased. Total EU imports increased notably. 
US exports to third countries decreased, and EU imports from third countries decreased. The 
price effects in third countries had marginal effects on demand in those countries. 
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The most surprising finding was that EU LGP production actually increased slightly in 
the first years of the implementation of the policy. This was unexpected because of the increased 
competition in the white rice market from the US. However, the model projects that resources 
will be substituted from the more quick reduction in MGP production to LGP production. A 
decrease in the land rental value drives a slight increase in the land used for LGP production. 
This was an advantage of the model disaggregating production by type and milling degree. If the 
model was aggregated by type, this substitution of production resources would not be apparent or 
even observable.  
The approach of this study was different from previous studies of the TTIP due to the 
focus on rice, instead of the entire economy or another commodity such as wine. This study 
differs from previous studies of rice trade because it focused on bilateral trade liberalization 
rather than a single country or a multilateral agreement. Again, the level of disaggregation of the 
RICEFLOW model was very important to the results we obtained, because the EU protection 
and preferences are very different by degree of processing and type of rice. When models 
aggregate different agricultural products, or in this case different levels of milling or types of 
rice, the results can be misleading. From the results of this study different advice can be given to 
producers and millers. 
 The EU milling industry will have the largest negative impact from the liberalization of 
rice trade. This study would recommend millers to study their market to see if it is likely their 
product will still be in demand. Millers would also be encouraged to increase efficiency in order 
to stay competitive. Specialized millers with good relationships in the market may not be 
impacted as heavily.  
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Different advice can even be given to producers of different types of rice. Producers in 
the EU medium grain market would be advised by this study to be cautious about continuing 
production after an agreement under TTIP. While some production will still be demanded, a 
portion of producers will need to make plan to change their business strategy. EU long grain will 
have less pressure for the first few years of policy implementation, however, when the tariffs are 
reduced further, they will have a similar situation as the medium grain producers.  
Producers and millers in the US would be advised that the demand for their products is 
likely to increase from the agreement, helping to sustain their investments in capital.  
 
B. Limitations of Study 
Since the RICEFLOW model is a partial equilibrium model, impacts to other related 
markets are not measured. There could be important relationships between rice production and 
other sectors of the economy that would affect the rice market behavior. The same limitation 
exists for the demand side, as prices of rice change, consumers might prefer a different product 
as a substitute. While there are variables in the model to account for some substitution of 
production and consumption into other products, these measurements were not analyzed. 
Data collection for the RICEFLOW model is time intensive and some values such as 
production costs are difficult to obtain. Also, much of the data are only available for certain years 
making it more difficult to insure that all of the database data are from the same year. This is due 
to time lags for government data collection and publishing. This data can also be aggregated in 
the report, so therefore it must be disaggregated manually. For example, total rice production 
would need to be disaggregated using external sources of information to separate it into types of 
rice. Some of the data required can also be considered as industry secrets by the commercial 
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entities from which it is obtained, for example, milling costs for a certain region. Ideally, the data 
set would contain an average cost of many millers for each region. However, obtaining that data 
would be a very difficult task and instead the values from a single or a few millers must be 
sufficient. Finally, the data are aggregated into annual values. This creates an unrealistic value 
for variables such as price, considering the market price changes constantly throughout the year.  
Relevant policy reforms, such as the 2014 US Farm Bill, the 2013 CAP Reform,  and 
outgoing preferential trade agreements (PTAs) such as DR-CAFTA and U.S.-Colombia PTA are 
likely to impact the way the US and EU rice markets behave in the near future. These policies 
are not accounted for in this study. Modeling the policies through the dynamic modelling would 
be an advantage to creating an accurate model to project future values. While these policies can 
be accounted for in the RICEFLOW model, it was decided to not include it in this study due to 
time constraints.  
Non-tariff barriers are not accounted for in this model. As mentioned above, a cause for 
the decrease of US exports to the EU was the finding of an unapproved GMO variety in 
shipments of rice bound for the EU. However, the scope of this study was limited to tariff 
barriers.  
Fragrant rice production in the US in not accounted for in this model. However, rice trade 
liberalization will have practically zero effect on US fragrant rice production. This study 
recognizes that there is fragrant paddy rice produced in the US. However, this production was 
not reported in the database that was used for this model. The US does not export fragrant rice, 
so this missing data had a marginal impact on the study.  
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The model relies heavily on elasticity values to regulate the behavior of the equations. 
Some of the elasticity values are obtained from authoritative sources, such as demand price 
elasticity from FAPRI. However, others are set to reflect reasonable assumptions, such as the 
elasticity of sluggish factors of production. The more accurate that the elasticity values can be 
calculated, the more accurate the model results would be. 
C. Future Research 
As mentioned in the limitations section, the RICEFLOW model can be altered to account 
for many of the limitations of this study. However, additional research is a large requirement to 
successfully alter the model to be more representative of the current market environment.  
The elasticity value for factors of supply are very important for the production values in 
the RICEFLOW model. In this study these elasticity values are set within reason. A study to 
accurately calculate the elasticity values for land in each region could greatly help the model 
generate even more realistic results. These values would also be very useful for other studies in 
projecting agricultural production.  
As mentioned in the limitations section, incorporating ongoing policy reforms in the 
model would bring the model further up to date. GEMPACK offers a way to implement non-
linear functions such as TRQs and minimum price support programs in the models. Investing in 
the implementation of these non-linear policies will likely improve the quality of the analysis. 
As mentioned in the limitations section, NTB values were not included in this study.  
Considering the history of the LL601 contamination, this point is debatable. In fact, a USA Rice 
Federation study declares the EU zero-tolerance policy for unapproved GM traits bound for 
consumption to be a NTB (USA Rice Federation, 2014). This argument makes sense even 
without the cost of double testing US rice, because the EU importers also assume risk by 
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importing US rice under the zero-tolerance policy (USA Rice Federation, 2014). EU importers 
incurred expenses from the Liberty Link 601 event in 2006 as they had to pay for testing, product 
withdrawal, legal costs, etc. (Brookes, 2008). It is reasonable to believe the companies would 
incur similar losses from another similar event. Considering these points, a study attempting to 
measure the impact of NTBs between the US and the EU would be valuable.  
Finally, the strength of the model is the disaggregation of rice by type and milling level. 
In the study of rural development, it would also be interesting to disaggregate the consumers by 
income level. This study projected over one percent price increases in Haiti and Mexico. While, 
the projected change in consumption is marginal in this model, this price increase could affect 
different members of the population differently. For members of the population living in poverty, 
that spend a large percentage of their income on food, this price change could have a greater 
effect on their household budget.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Table 1: Model Elasticity Values Not Explicitly Stated in Text 
Production 
Supply: 
Land
Production 
Supply: Land 
Transformation
Consumption 
Demand: 
Income 
Consumption 
Demand: 
Own Price 
Consumption 
Demand: 
Substitution
ARGENTINA 0.25 -1 0.11 -0.07 0.0175
AUSTRALIA 0.25 -1 0.43 -0.41 0.1025
BANGLADESH 0.25 -1 -0.04 -0.01 0.0025
BENIN 0.25 -1 0.25 -0.15 0.0375
BOLIVIA 0.25 -1 0.11 -0.1 0.025
BRAZIL 0.25 -1 -0.05 -0.1 0.025
BURKINA FASO 0.25 -1 0.25 -0.15 0.0375
CAMBODIA 0.25 -1 -0.23 -0.2 0.05
CAMEROON 0.25 -1 0.25 -0.15 0.0375
CANADA 0.25 -1 0.47 -0.21 0.0525
CHILE 0.25 -1 0.11 -0.07 0.0175
CHINA 0.25 -10 -0.07 -0.16 0.04
COLOMBIA 0.25 -1 -0.05 -0.1 0.025
COSTARICA 0.25 -1 0.46 -0.05 0.0125
COTE D'IVOIRE 0.25 -1 0.14 -0.55 0.1375
CUBA 0.25 -1 0.46 -0.05 0.0125
ECUADOR 0.25 -1 0.11 -0.1 0.025
EGYPT 0.025 -1 0.3 -0.15 0.0375
ELSALVADOR 0.25 -1 0.46 -0.05 0.0125
EU 0.15 -5 0.38 -0.2 0.05
GAMBIA 0.25 -1 0.14 -0.15 0.0375
GHANA 0.25 -1 0.14 -0.15 0.0375
GUATEMALA 0.25 -1 0.46 -0.05 0.0125
GUINEA 0.25 -1 0.14 -0.15 0.0375
GUINEA BISSAU 0.25 -1 0.14 -0.15 0.0375
GUYANA 0.25 -1 -0.05 -0.1 0.025
HAITI 0.25 -1 0.46 -0.05 0.0125
HONDURAS 0.25 -1 0.46 -0.05 0.0125
HONG KONG 0.25 -1 -0.26 -0.11 0.0275
INDIA 0.01 -10 -0.04 -0.2 0.05
INDONESIA 0.25 -1 -0.12 -0.14 0.035
IRAN 0.25 -1 0.2 -0.35 0.0875
IRAQ 0.25 -1 0.14 -0.1 0.025
JAPAN 0.25 -1 -0.26 -0.11 0.0275
LAOS 0.25 -1 -0.23 -0.2 0.05
LIBERIA 0.25 -1 0.14 -0.15 0.0375
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Appendix Appendix Table 1: Continued 
Production 
Supply: 
Land
Production 
Supply: Land 
Transformation
Consumption 
Demand: 
Income 
Consumption 
Demand: 
Own Price 
Consumption 
Demand: 
Substitution
MALAYSIA 0.25 -1 0.09 -0.3 0.075
MALI 0.25 -1 0.14 -0.15 0.0375
MEXICO 0.25 -1 0.46 -0.05 0.0125
MYANMAR 0.25 -1 0.13 -0.1 0.025
NICARAGUA 0.25 -1 0.46 -0.05 0.0125
NIGER 0.25 -1 0.25 -0.15 0.0375
NIGERIA 0.25 -1 0.25 -0.15 0.0375
PAKISTAN 0.25 -10 0.1 -0.18 0.045
PANAMA 0.25 -1 0.46 -0.05 0.0125
PARAGUAY 0.25 -1 0.11 -0.1 0.025
PERU 0.25 -1 -0.05 -0.1 0.025
PHILIPPINES 0.25 -1 0.15 -0.25 0.0625
RUSSIA 0.25 -1 0.38 -0.15 0.0375
SAUDI ARABIA 0.25 -1 0.1 -0.25 0.0625
SENEGAL 0.25 -1 0.14 -0.15 0.0375
SIERRA LEONE 0.25 -1 -0.03 -0.11 0.0275
SINGAPORE 0.25 -1 0.14 -0.15 0.0375
SOUTH KOREA 0.25 -1 -0.27 -0.54 0.135
SOUTH AFRICA 0.25 -1 0.47 -0.2 0.05
SRILANKA 0.25 -1 -0.04 -0.2 0.05
SURINAME 0.25 -1 -0.05 -0.1 0.025
TAIWAN 0.25 -1 -0.26 -0.11 0.0275
TANZANIA 0.25 -1 0.25 -0.15 0.0375
THAILAND 0.01 -10 -0.16 -0.05 0.0125
TOGO 0.25 -1 0.25 -0.15 0.0375
TURKEY 0.25 -1 0.38 -0.15 0.0375
UAE 0.25 -1 0.1 -0.25 0.0625
URUGUAY 0.25 -1 0.5 -0.17 0.0425
USA 0.25 -5 0.34 -0.01 0.0025
VENEZUELA 0.25 -1 0.11 -0.07 0.0175
VIETNAM 0.01 -1 -0.23 -0.2 0.05
OAFRICA 0.25 -1 0.18 -0.15 0.0375
OASIA 0.25 -1 -0.04 -0.11 0.0275
OCARIBBEAN 0.25 -1 0.46 -0.05 0.0125
OEUROPE 0.25 -1 0.38 -0.15 0.0375
OMIDDLE EAST 0.25 -1 0.1 -0.25 0.0625
OOCEANIA 0.25 -1 0.43 -0.41 0.1025
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Appendix Table 2: Percent Changes in Yield 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA 1.6 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
AUSTRALIA 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
BANGLADESH 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
BENIN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BOLIVIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BRAZIL 0.6 1.3 1.9 1.3 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
BURKINA FASO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CAMBODIA 3.4 3.4 1.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
CAMEROON 3.4 2.3 2.3 1.8 1.8 1.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
CANADA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CHILE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CHINA 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
COLOMBIA 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
COSTARICA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
COTE D'IVOIRE 2.8 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
CUBA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ECUADOR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
EGYPT 1.4 1.9 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
ELSALVADOR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
EU 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
GAMBIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GHANA 2.9 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
GUATEMALA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GUINEA 2.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
GUINEA BISSAU 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GUYANA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
HAITI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
HONDURAS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
HONG KONG 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
INDIA 1.5 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7
INDONESIA 1.5 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.2 0.9 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
IRAN 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8
IRAQ 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
JAPAN 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
LAOS 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.1 1.5 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
LIBERIA 3.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
MALAYSIA 0.8 0.8 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
MALI 3.5 3.0 2.7 2.2 2.5 2.9 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3
MEXICO 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.6 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
MYANMAR 1.7 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
NICARAGUA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NIGER 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NIGERIA 2.9 3.6 1.9 1.1 1.5 1.5 1.8 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
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Appendix Appendix Table 2: Continued 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
PAKISTAN 0.7 1.6 1.0 0.1 1.7 1.0 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
PANAMA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PARAGUAY 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PERU 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PHILIPPINES 0.9 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
RUSSIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SAUDI ARABIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SENEGAL 2.6 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.4 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
SIERRA LEONE 3.6 3.1 2.1 2.1 1.1 3.1 2.1 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
SINGAPORE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SOUTH KOREA 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
SOUTH AFRICA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SRILANKA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SURINAME 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TAIWAN 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
TANZANIA 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6
THAILAND 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1
TOGO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TURKEY 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
UAE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
URUGUAY 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
USA 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9
VENEZUELA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
VIETNAM 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
OAFRICA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OASIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OCARIBBEAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OEUROPE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OMIDDLE EAST 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OOCEANIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Appendix Table 3: Beginning Stocks in TMT 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA 127 104 100 82 82 91 95 98 100 100 100
AUSTRALIA 32 59 98 138 165 180 188 186 180 180 180
BANGLADESH 900 861 854 864 864 863 872 881 890 890 890
BENIN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BOLIVIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BRAZIL 1,422 1,525 1,583 1,632 1,675 1,720 1,765 1,812 1,860 1,860 1,860
BURKINA FASO 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
CAMBODIA 273 276 279 281 284 286 289 292 294 294 294
CAMEROON 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CANADA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CHILE 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79
CHINA 46,574 48,591 51,000 53,078 55,269 58,008 61,228 64,719 68,757 68,757 68,757
COLOMBIA 219 276 325 365 402 436 469 504 535 535 535
COSTARICA 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 40
COTE D'IVOIRE 295 306 309 315 321 327 335 343 349 349 349
CUBA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ECUADOR 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
EGYPT 648 556 600 654 704 747 766 767 755 755 755
ELSALVADOR 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
EU 881 816 753 698 649 596 549 532 544 544 544
GAMBIA 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26 26
GHANA 126 137 145 154 163 171 179 188 196 196 196
GUATEMALA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GUINEA 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 129 129 129
GUINEA BISSAU 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
GUYANA 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75 75
HAITI 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68 68
HONDURAS 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
HONG KONG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
INDIA 21,704 22,693 23,792 24,531 24,728 24,862 25,016 25,075 24,986 24,986 24,986
INDONESIA 4,736 4,906 5,041 5,120 5,160 5,178 5,186 5,189 5,190 5,190 5,190
IRAN 530 494 484 491 500 515 532 549 569 569 569
IRAQ 347 358 365 371 377 383 387 391 394 394 394
JAPAN 2,909 2,750 2,611 2,426 2,262 2,084 1,963 1,892 1,850 1,850 1,850
LAOS 30 30 30 30 31 31 31 32 32 32 32
LIBERIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MALAYSIA 735 730 736 721 729 725 721 718 724 724 724
MALI 292 288 287 284 281 277 274 270 265 265 265
MEXICO 165 166 168 172 172 174 177 177 171 171 171
MYANMAR 436 520 638 816 943 1,059 1,169 1,307 1,486 1,486 1,486
NICARAGUA 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139
NIGER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NIGERIA 667 683 696 704 711 715 718 721 722 722 722
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Appendix Appendix Table 3: Continued 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
PAKISTAN 604 617 622 676 699 700 718 702 669 670 670
PANAMA 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45
PARAGUAY 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
PERU 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285 285
PHILIPPINES 2,846 2,919 2,956 2,986 3,019 3,045 3,071 3,100 3,130 3,130 3,130
RUSSIA 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94
SAUDI ARABIA 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 234
SENEGAL 281 294 307 320 333 346 358 371 376 376 376
SIERRA LEONE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SINGAPORE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SOUTH KOREA 872 941 966 989 1,036 1,080 1,142 1,190 1,233 1,233 1,233
SOUTH AFRICA 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
SRILANKA 395 395 395 395 395 395 395 395 395 395 395
SURINAME 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TAIWAN 242 220 208 206 204 201 199 200 207 207 207
TANZANIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
THAILAND 10,994 10,174 9,304 8,479 7,641 6,810 6,008 5,219 4,455 4,455 4,455
TOGO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TURKEY 215 223 222 225 229 233 231 233 235 235 235
UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
URUGUAY 153 160 169 177 187 196 206 217 228 228 228
USA 1,488 1,422 1,328 1,270 1,247 1,212 1,194 1,170 1,165 1,165 1,165
VENEZUELA 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149 149
VIETNAM 2,091 2,391 2,517 3,160 3,869 3,998 4,080 4,206 4,312 4,312 4,312
OAFRICA 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107 107
OASIA 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 39
OCARIBBEAN 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
OEUROPE 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58 58
OMIDDLE EAST 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OOCEANIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 106,058 108,713 111,722 114,647 117,166 119,482 122,350 125,483 129,097 129,097 129,097
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Appendix Table 4: Benchmark Percent Changes in LGP Production 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA 2.57 2.03 1.31 2.33 1.62 1.12 1.33 2.19 2.10 2.16 2.14
AUSTRALIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BANGLADESH 0.95 0.99 0.94 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.79 0.76 0.71 0.70 0.67
BENIN 0.82 0.69 0.64 0.45 0.15 0.41 0.57 0.69 0.67 0.63 0.58
BOLIVIA 1.08 1.01 0.78 0.90 0.88 0.82 0.78 0.77 0.69 0.69 0.65
BRAZIL 0.33 1.00 1.68 1.23 0.94 1.03 1.17 1.07 0.71 1.03 1.01
BURKINA FASO 1.65 1.08 1.09 0.80 0.71 0.88 0.83 1.01 0.62 0.84 0.78
CAMBODIA 2.28 2.15 1.11 1.72 1.48 1.69 1.82 1.06 0.90 1.04 1.03
CAMEROON 6.60 4.30 4.26 3.06 2.78 2.10 3.90 3.94 3.84 3.82 3.76
CANADA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CHILE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CHINA 0.85 0.05 -0.19 -0.12 -0.03 0.03 -0.14 -0.05 -2.13 -0.33 -0.35
COLOMBIA 1.02 0.97 0.82 1.03 0.92 1.04 1.06 0.85 -0.21 0.93 0.89
COSTARICA 0.56 0.79 0.71 0.74 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.64 0.54 0.49 0.44
COTE D'IVOIRE 5.67 2.99 3.43 2.81 2.44 2.76 2.85 4.53 4.28 4.46 4.38
CUBA 0.79 -0.64 0.45 -0.15 -0.72 -0.04 0.23 0.47 0.18 0.51 0.51
ECUADOR 1.39 1.39 1.38 1.37 1.33 1.33 1.31 1.30 1.26 1.25 1.22
EGYPT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ELSALVADOR -1.38 0.54 0.79 0.74 0.19 0.46 0.47 0.72 0.48 0.52 0.46
EU 1.10 0.83 0.78 0.59 0.46 0.70 0.48 0.73 1.53 1.35 1.34
GAMBIA 1.99 0.95 0.58 1.11 0.51 1.11 1.50 1.92 1.79 1.87 1.80
GHANA 6.93 4.10 3.83 3.14 2.65 3.05 3.33 3.18 2.72 3.22 3.15
GUATEMALA -0.44 0.97 1.10 1.10 0.65 0.84 0.84 1.03 0.82 0.84 0.78
GUINEA 2.98 3.20 2.84 2.63 2.30 2.47 2.54 2.62 2.49 2.54 2.50
GUINEA BISSAU 1.41 1.21 1.19 1.01 0.59 0.97 1.20 1.33 1.30 1.28 1.22
GUYANA 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.21
HAITI -0.58 0.47 0.95 0.64 -0.22 0.22 0.32 0.55 0.30 0.45 0.42
HONDURAS -0.59 0.70 0.88 0.83 0.40 0.58 0.57 0.73 0.55 0.57 0.52
HONG KONG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
INDIA 1.42 1.03 0.93 0.88 1.22 1.09 0.85 0.70 0.73 0.71 0.70
INDONESIA 1.06 0.62 0.75 0.69 0.63 0.60 0.66 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.36
IRAN 3.17 2.41 1.99 1.62 1.53 1.53 1.49 1.57 1.05 1.46 1.43
IRAQ -7.38 -0.21 2.26 3.63 2.02 1.93 2.47 2.68 0.54 2.72 2.61
JAPAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LAOS 0.72 0.70 0.68 0.66 0.54 0.60 0.58 0.63 0.59 0.56 0.53
LIBERIA 3.11 1.38 0.93 0.51 -0.12 0.69 1.25 1.67 1.77 1.65 1.57
MALAYSIA 1.69 1.32 1.84 2.17 0.85 1.72 1.81 2.09 1.70 1.89 1.86
MALI 3.51 3.50 3.17 2.91 2.95 3.15 2.84 2.80 2.86 2.71 2.67
MEXICO -0.46 2.49 2.24 1.59 2.19 1.95 1.21 -1.36 1.00 -0.19 -0.23
MYANMAR 3.04 2.53 2.38 1.80 1.71 1.52 1.82 1.63 0.82 1.45 1.42
NICARAGUA 1.25 1.03 0.45 0.76 0.78 0.73 0.70 0.75 0.66 0.64 0.60
NIGER 3.67 3.50 3.25 2.87 2.59 2.84 3.03 3.19 3.20 3.14 3.08
NIGERIA 7.34 8.47 4.63 2.81 3.15 3.37 4.12 5.38 5.23 5.04 4.87
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Appendix Appendix Table 4: Continued
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
PAKISTAN 1.20 2.59 1.95 -0.17 2.83 1.46 0.07 0.50 0.25 0.49 0.50
PANAMA 0.56 0.63 0.49 0.55 0.43 0.40 0.37 0.41 0.31 0.32 0.30
PARAGUAY -1.07 -1.39 -2.21 -1.58 -1.55 -1.67 -1.60 -1.46 -1.82 -1.65 -1.75
PERU 0.52 0.55 0.48 0.50 0.46 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.32 0.29
PHILIPPINES 1.18 1.80 2.12 1.94 1.88 2.08 1.98 2.02 1.84 1.96 1.94
RUSSIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SAUDI ARABIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SENEGAL 3.83 3.36 3.23 2.96 3.07 2.55 2.64 2.55 2.60 2.69 2.65
SIERRA LEONE 5.07 4.27 3.10 3.04 1.85 3.91 2.99 2.57 2.51 2.50 2.46
SINGAPORE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SOUTH KOREA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SOUTH AFRICA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SRILANKA 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.25 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.10
SURINAME 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.47 0.44 0.43 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.36
TAIWAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TANZANIA 5.03 4.49 4.51 4.32 3.54 3.96 4.13 4.13 4.05 3.94 3.81
THAILAND -0.14 -0.83 -0.28 -1.02 -1.79 -0.84 -0.39 0.19 2.66 0.09 0.03
TOGO 1.12 0.63 0.77 0.34 -0.25 0.35 0.68 0.92 0.84 0.87 0.81
TURKEY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
UAE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
URUGUAY 2.03 1.45 1.22 1.39 1.22 2.56 2.64 2.73 2.30 2.57 2.51
USA 0.59 1.01 1.39 1.27 0.98 1.29 1.28 1.44 1.39 1.38 1.35
VENEZUELA -0.24 0.12 0.09 0.24 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.08 0.11 0.09
VIETNAM 0.73 0.45 0.66 0.61 -0.32 0.19 0.23 0.12 -0.17 0.03 -0.03
OAFRICA 0.13 -0.08 0.06 -0.15 -0.67 -0.23 0.05 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.16
OASIA -0.31 -0.48 -0.40 -0.57 -0.80 -0.53 -0.38 -0.26 -0.27 -0.24 -0.25
OCARIBBEAN 0.60 0.72 0.79 0.79 0.67 0.73 0.74 0.81 0.73 0.76 0.73
OEUROPE -0.02 -0.45 -0.19 -0.45 -0.82 -0.46 -0.25 -0.12 -0.22 -0.14 -0.13
OMIDDLE EAST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OOCEANIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Appendix Table 5: Scenario Percent Changes in LGP Production 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA 2.57 2.03 1.31 2.33 1.62 1.12 1.34 2.19 2.10 2.17 2.15
AUSTRALIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BANGLADESH 0.95 0.99 0.94 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.79 0.76 0.71 0.70 0.67
BENIN 0.82 0.70 0.65 0.45 0.15 0.42 0.58 0.70 0.68 0.64 0.59
BOLIVIA 1.08 1.01 0.78 0.90 0.88 0.82 0.78 0.77 0.69 0.69 0.65
BRAZIL 0.33 1.00 1.68 1.23 0.94 1.03 1.17 1.07 0.71 1.04 1.02
BURKINA FASO 1.65 1.08 1.09 0.80 0.71 0.88 0.83 1.01 0.63 0.84 0.78
CAMBODIA 2.29 2.15 1.12 1.73 1.49 1.70 1.83 1.07 0.90 1.05 1.04
CAMEROON 6.61 4.30 4.27 3.07 2.79 2.10 3.91 3.95 3.84 3.82 3.76
CANADA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CHILE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CHINA 0.85 0.05 -0.19 -0.12 -0.03 0.03 -0.14 -0.05 -2.13 -0.33 -0.35
COLOMBIA 1.03 0.99 0.83 1.04 0.94 1.07 1.10 0.89 -0.16 0.98 0.95
COSTARICA 0.58 0.80 0.73 0.77 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.69 0.60 0.56 0.52
COTE D'IVOIRE 5.67 2.99 3.44 2.81 2.44 2.77 2.86 4.54 4.29 4.48 4.40
CUBA 0.79 -0.64 0.45 -0.15 -0.72 -0.04 0.23 0.47 0.18 0.51 0.52
ECUADOR 1.39 1.39 1.38 1.37 1.34 1.33 1.32 1.31 1.27 1.26 1.23
EGYPT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ELSALVADOR -1.28 0.65 0.92 0.90 0.38 0.70 0.78 1.09 0.90 1.01 1.02
EU 1.22 0.92 0.84 0.60 0.37 0.49 0.14 0.12 0.35 -0.28 -0.91
GAMBIA 1.99 0.95 0.58 1.11 0.52 1.11 1.50 1.92 1.79 1.87 1.81
GHANA 6.95 4.11 3.84 3.16 2.67 3.08 3.35 3.21 2.75 3.25 3.18
GUATEMALA -0.37 1.06 1.20 1.22 0.79 1.02 1.07 1.30 1.11 1.18 1.16
GUINEA 2.98 3.20 2.84 2.64 2.30 2.47 2.54 2.62 2.50 2.55 2.50
GUINEA BISSAU 1.41 1.21 1.20 1.01 0.59 0.97 1.20 1.33 1.31 1.28 1.23
GUYANA 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.25 0.25 0.24
HAITI -0.50 0.56 1.05 0.75 -0.08 0.39 0.55 0.82 0.60 0.79 0.81
HONDURAS -0.52 0.78 0.97 0.94 0.54 0.74 0.79 0.99 0.84 0.90 0.90
HONG KONG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
INDIA 1.42 1.03 0.93 0.88 1.22 1.09 0.85 0.70 0.73 0.71 0.70
INDONESIA 1.06 0.62 0.75 0.69 0.64 0.60 0.67 0.44 0.40 0.39 0.37
IRAN 3.18 2.41 1.99 1.63 1.54 1.54 1.51 1.59 1.08 1.49 1.46
IRAQ -7.38 -0.21 2.27 3.64 2.03 1.94 2.48 2.70 0.55 2.74 2.63
JAPAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LAOS 0.72 0.70 0.68 0.66 0.54 0.60 0.58 0.63 0.59 0.56 0.53
LIBERIA 3.12 1.39 0.94 0.52 -0.11 0.71 1.26 1.70 1.80 1.68 1.60
MALAYSIA 1.70 1.33 1.85 2.18 0.86 1.73 1.82 2.10 1.71 1.90 1.87
MALI 3.51 3.50 3.17 2.91 2.95 3.15 2.85 2.80 2.86 2.71 2.67
MEXICO -0.37 2.59 2.36 1.74 2.35 2.15 1.48 -0.98 1.33 0.25 0.28
MYANMAR 3.04 2.53 2.38 1.80 1.71 1.52 1.83 1.63 0.83 1.46 1.43
NICARAGUA 1.26 1.04 0.45 0.76 0.79 0.74 0.71 0.76 0.67 0.65 0.61
NIGER 3.67 3.50 3.25 2.87 2.59 2.85 3.03 3.20 3.20 3.14 3.09
NIGERIA 7.34 8.47 4.63 2.81 3.15 3.37 4.12 5.38 5.23 5.04 4.88
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Appendix Appendix Table 5: Continued 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
PAKISTAN 1.20 2.59 1.95 -0.17 2.84 1.46 0.08 0.51 0.26 0.51 0.52
PANAMA 0.58 0.64 0.51 0.57 0.46 0.43 0.41 0.46 0.36 0.38 0.36
PARAGUAY -1.09 -1.40 -2.23 -1.61 -1.58 -1.72 -1.67 -1.55 -1.93 -1.77 -1.89
PERU 0.52 0.55 0.48 0.50 0.46 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.32 0.29
PHILIPPINES 1.19 1.80 2.13 1.95 1.89 2.09 1.99 2.03 1.85 1.97 1.95
RUSSIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SAUDI ARABIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SENEGAL 3.83 3.36 3.23 2.96 3.07 2.55 2.64 2.56 2.60 2.69 2.66
SIERRA LEONE 5.07 4.27 3.10 3.04 1.85 3.91 2.99 2.57 2.51 2.50 2.46
SINGAPORE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SOUTH KOREA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SOUTH AFRICA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SRILANKA 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12
SURINAME 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.45 0.43 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.36
TAIWAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TANZANIA 5.03 4.49 4.52 4.32 3.55 3.96 4.14 4.13 4.06 3.95 3.82
THAILAND -0.15 -0.83 -0.29 -1.03 -1.80 -0.85 -0.40 0.17 2.64 0.06 0.01
TOGO 1.12 0.64 0.77 0.35 -0.25 0.36 0.69 0.93 0.85 0.88 0.82
TURKEY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
UAE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
URUGUAY 2.02 1.44 1.21 1.38 1.21 2.55 2.63 2.72 2.29 2.56 2.50
USA 0.63 1.06 1.46 1.37 1.11 1.46 1.51 1.74 1.76 1.84 1.90
VENEZUELA -0.22 0.15 0.11 0.27 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.26 0.16 0.21 0.20
VIETNAM 0.73 0.45 0.66 0.61 -0.32 0.20 0.23 0.13 -0.16 0.04 -0.02
OAFRICA 0.13 -0.08 0.06 -0.14 -0.66 -0.22 0.06 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.18
OASIA -0.31 -0.47 -0.40 -0.57 -0.80 -0.53 -0.37 -0.26 -0.26 -0.24 -0.24
OCARIBBEAN 0.61 0.73 0.80 0.81 0.70 0.77 0.78 0.85 0.79 0.82 0.80
OEUROPE -0.03 -0.46 -0.21 -0.47 -0.84 -0.49 -0.29 -0.16 -0.28 -0.21 -0.23
OMIDDLE EAST 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OOCEANIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Appendix Table 6: Benchmark Percent Changes in MGP Production 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
AUSTRALIA 2.5 2.4 1.9 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.4 1.7 2.0 1.8 1.8
BANGLADESH 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BENIN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BOLIVIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BRAZIL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
BURKINA FASO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CAMBODIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CAMEROON 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CANADA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CHILE 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.6
CHINA 0.8 0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 -0.1 0.0 -2.1 -0.3 -0.3
COLOMBIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
COSTARICA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
COTE D'IVOIRE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
CUBA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
ECUADOR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
EGYPT 1.5 2.6 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1
ELSALVADOR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
EU 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.6 1.5 0.5 0.8 0.8
GAMBIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GHANA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GUATEMALA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GUINEA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GUINEA BISSAU 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
GUYANA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
HAITI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
HONDURAS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
HONG KONG 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
INDIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
INDONESIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
IRAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
IRAQ 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
JAPAN -2.5 -0.5 -1.1 -0.6 -0.9 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.8 -0.8
LAOS 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
LIBERIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MALAYSIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MALI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MEXICO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
MYANMAR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NICARAGUA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NIGER 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
NIGERIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Appendix Appendix Table 6: Continued 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
PAKISTAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PANAMA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PARAGUAY 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PERU 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
PHILIPPINES 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
RUSSIA 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4
SAUDI ARABIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SENEGAL 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SIERRA LEONE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SINGAPORE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SOUTH KOREA -0.5 -0.9 -0.3 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.9 -0.1 -0.1
SOUTH AFRICA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SRILANKA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SURINAME 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TAIWAN -0.8 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 -0.5 -0.3 0.0 -0.9 -0.4 -0.4
TANZANIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
THAILAND 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TOGO 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
TURKEY 3.7 1.5 2.4 2.1 1.7 1.5 2.1 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.7
UAE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
URUGUAY 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
USA -0.5 2.1 1.8 1.7 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.1
VENEZUELA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
VIETNAM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OAFRICA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OASIA -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1
OCARIBBEAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OEUROPE 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OMIDDLE EAST 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
OOCEANIA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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Appendix Table 7: Scenario Percent Changes in MGP Production 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
AUSTRALIA 2.50 2.39 1.86 1.27 1.19 1.53 1.47 1.68 2.01 1.80 1.79
BANGLADESH 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BENIN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BOLIVIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BRAZIL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
BURKINA FASO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CAMBODIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CAMEROON 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CANADA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CHILE 0.60 0.88 0.90 0.86 0.74 0.77 0.77 0.80 0.74 0.74 0.72
CHINA 0.81 0.14 -0.18 -0.03 0.10 0.10 -0.07 0.01 -2.08 -0.26 -0.28
COLOMBIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
COSTARICA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
COTE D'IVOIRE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
CUBA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ECUADOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EGYPT 1.47 2.56 1.45 1.26 1.21 1.14 1.16 1.16 1.21 1.15 1.13
ELSALVADOR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
EU 0.83 0.84 0.91 0.81 0.52 0.66 1.15 1.10 0.20 0.47 0.50
GAMBIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GHANA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GUATEMALA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GUINEA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GUINEA BISSAU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
GUYANA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HAITI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HONDURAS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
HONG KONG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
INDIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
INDONESIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IRAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
IRAQ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
JAPAN -2.48 -0.52 -1.09 -0.59 -0.93 -0.30 -0.31 -0.49 -0.39 -0.75 -0.76
LAOS 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
LIBERIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MALAYSIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MALI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MEXICO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MYANMAR 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NICARAGUA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NIGER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NIGERIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Appendix Appendix Table 7: Continued 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
PAKISTAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PANAMA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PARAGUAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PERU 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
PHILIPPINES 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RUSSIA 0.55 0.62 0.57 0.55 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.37 0.41 0.40
SAUDI ARABIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SENEGAL 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SIERRA LEONE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SINGAPORE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SOUTH KOREA -0.47 -0.85 -0.30 0.04 -0.34 -0.04 -0.36 -0.16 -0.85 -0.12 -0.11
SOUTH AFRICA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SRILANKA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SURINAME 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TAIWAN -0.77 -0.07 -0.11 -0.51 -0.65 -0.43 -0.28 0.00 -0.85 -0.38 -0.38
TANZANIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
THAILAND 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOGO 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TURKEY 3.65 1.52 2.38 2.10 1.72 1.45 2.08 1.72 1.52 1.63 1.61
UAE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
URUGUAY 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
USA -0.42 2.19 1.96 1.80 1.36 1.39 1.36 1.51 1.11 1.22 1.16
VENEZUELA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
VIETNAM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OAFRICA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OASIA -0.15 -0.18 -0.23 -0.21 -0.21 -0.20 -0.15 -0.11 -0.23 -0.12 -0.12
OCARIBBEAN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OEUROPE 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OMIDDLE EAST 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
OOCEANIA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Appendix Table 8: Benchmark Percentage Changes in LGW Production 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA 2.58 0.91 2.49 1.33 1.14 1.61 1.57 2.36 2.33 2.27 2.25
AUSTRALIA 1.83 1.40 1.50 1.01 0.49 1.00 1.32 1.63 1.45 1.51 1.46
BANGLADESH 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.88 0.84 0.82 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.70 0.67
BENIN 0.82 0.69 0.64 0.45 0.15 0.41 0.57 0.69 0.67 0.63 0.58
BOLIVIA 1.12 1.04 0.83 0.94 0.92 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.74 0.74 0.70
BRAZIL 0.78 1.10 1.40 1.01 0.72 0.80 0.92 0.85 0.86 0.82 0.80
BURKINA FASO 1.65 1.08 1.09 0.80 0.71 0.88 0.83 1.01 0.62 0.84 0.78
CAMBODIA 1.50 1.42 0.77 1.16 1.01 1.14 1.23 0.72 0.57 0.68 0.66
CAMEROON 6.60 4.30 4.26 3.06 2.78 2.10 3.90 3.94 3.84 3.82 3.76
CANADA 1.85 1.53 1.62 1.46 1.39 1.37 1.45 1.56 1.59 1.48 1.49
CHILE 1.24 1.22 0.86 0.91 0.72 0.72 0.88 0.64 0.61 0.63 0.59
CHINA -0.03 -0.15 -0.02 -0.17 -0.30 -0.21 -0.28 -0.33 -0.15 -0.33 -0.35
COLOMBIA 1.09 1.30 1.31 1.15 1.09 1.05 1.01 1.03 1.15 0.92 0.88
COSTARICA 2.00 1.91 1.81 1.84 1.85 1.76 1.78 1.73 1.68 1.54 1.48
COTE D'IVOIRE 4.67 3.92 3.09 2.89 2.42 2.63 2.83 4.76 4.83 4.46 4.38
CUBA 0.79 -0.64 0.45 -0.15 -0.72 -0.04 0.23 0.47 0.18 0.51 0.51
ECUADOR 1.39 1.39 1.38 1.37 1.33 1.33 1.31 1.30 1.26 1.25 1.22
EGYPT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ELSALVADOR 1.78 1.82 1.75 1.77 1.80 1.77 1.77 1.77 1.75 1.68 1.65
EU 0.73 0.73 0.63 0.35 0.23 0.45 -0.10 0.17 1.72 1.28 1.27
GAMBIA 1.99 0.95 0.58 1.11 0.51 1.11 1.50 1.92 1.79 1.87 1.80
GHANA 6.71 4.60 3.76 3.23 2.72 3.15 3.11 3.49 3.63 3.19 3.12
GUATEMALA 2.99 2.88 2.85 2.83 2.81 2.78 2.79 2.79 2.75 2.69 2.64
GUINEA 3.00 3.20 2.86 2.62 2.30 2.47 2.53 2.61 2.55 2.54 2.50
GUINEA BISSAU 1.41 1.21 1.19 1.01 0.59 0.97 1.20 1.33 1.30 1.28 1.22
GUYANA 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.17
HAITI -0.57 0.48 0.95 0.64 -0.22 0.22 0.33 0.55 0.30 0.45 0.42
HONDURAS 2.93 2.65 2.58 2.58 2.57 2.50 2.48 2.46 2.41 2.34 2.29
HONG KONG 0.70 -2.12 -0.45 -2.09 -3.48 -2.04 -1.41 -0.97 -1.60 -0.88 -0.89
INDIA 1.11 0.97 1.15 1.21 1.26 1.08 0.91 0.78 0.68 0.71 0.70
INDONESIA 0.82 0.68 0.84 0.75 0.67 0.61 0.67 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.36
IRAN 0.75 1.27 1.33 1.49 1.36 1.42 1.49 1.50 1.80 1.46 1.43
IRAQ 7.41 4.87 3.91 2.89 3.43 3.25 2.96 2.99 3.62 2.72 2.61
JAPAN -0.42 -0.13 -0.11 0.18 1.25 0.20 -1.52 -1.72 0.70 -0.02 0.02
LAOS 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.66 0.54 0.60 0.58 0.63 0.60 0.56 0.53
LIBERIA 3.11 1.38 0.93 0.51 -0.12 0.69 1.25 1.67 1.77 1.65 1.57
MALAYSIA 1.80 0.93 2.57 1.38 1.27 1.69 1.80 1.77 1.90 1.89 1.85
MALI 3.84 3.36 3.26 2.89 2.98 3.15 2.86 2.80 2.70 2.71 2.67
MEXICO 3.04 2.19 2.03 2.08 1.93 1.93 2.02 1.87 1.79 1.83 1.82
MYANMAR 2.83 2.37 2.10 2.05 1.78 1.56 1.71 1.45 1.62 1.45 1.42
NICARAGUA 2.88 2.91 2.16 2.46 2.44 2.41 2.42 2.42 2.38 2.31 2.27
NIGER 3.67 3.50 3.25 2.87 2.59 2.84 3.03 3.19 3.20 3.14 3.08
NIGERIA 7.40 8.58 4.70 2.86 3.18 3.39 4.14 5.39 5.25 5.04 4.87
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Appendix Appendix Table 8: Continued 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
PAKISTAN 0.97 2.64 1.42 0.16 3.00 1.28 0.42 0.66 -0.01 0.49 0.50
PANAMA 1.78 1.25 0.93 1.05 1.09 0.93 0.88 0.86 0.77 0.77 0.75
PARAGUAY -1.66 -1.68 -2.67 -2.03 -2.16 -2.36 -2.22 -2.18 -2.72 -2.49 -2.65
PERU 0.52 0.55 0.48 0.50 0.46 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.32 0.29
PHILIPPINES 2.36 1.99 2.17 1.93 1.92 2.08 1.97 2.01 1.98 1.96 1.94
RUSSIA 0.79 -1.52 -0.41 -2.12 -3.41 -1.42 -0.78 0.15 -0.37 0.11 0.06
SAUDI ARABIA -1.26 -0.16 -0.71 -1.49 -3.03 -1.49 -0.50 0.39 0.49 0.30 0.13
SENEGAL 3.64 3.49 3.24 3.10 3.13 2.59 2.68 3.46 3.24 2.69 2.65
SIERRA LEONE 5.07 4.27 3.10 3.04 1.85 3.91 2.99 2.57 2.51 2.50 2.46
SINGAPORE 0.21 2.17 -0.04 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.93 1.26 1.92 1.22 1.11
SOUTH KOREA -0.79 -0.36 -0.78 -0.70 -0.86 -0.55 -0.30 -0.10 0.04 -0.07 -0.10
SOUTH AFRICA 2.05 1.70 1.17 0.55 -0.10 1.13 1.89 2.42 2.73 2.57 2.51
SRILANKA 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.25 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.10
SURINAME 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.38
TAIWAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TANZANIA 5.06 4.51 4.53 4.34 3.56 3.97 4.15 4.15 4.08 3.96 3.83
THAILAND 0.17 -0.21 -0.21 -0.58 -1.37 -0.53 -0.03 0.31 0.17 0.31 0.26
TOGO 1.12 0.63 0.77 0.34 -0.25 0.35 0.68 0.92 0.84 0.87 0.81
TURKEY 4.03 1.68 1.08 0.90 0.94 1.18 1.83 1.69 1.34 1.43 1.44
UAE 3.26 2.49 0.63 -0.84 0.06 0.25 0.69 1.16 1.46 1.32 1.26
URUGUAY 1.72 1.62 1.43 1.53 1.41 2.66 2.74 2.79 3.15 2.69 2.63
USA 3.17 1.00 0.84 0.58 0.69 0.80 1.07 1.01 1.04 1.14 1.11
VENEZUELA 1.53 1.52 1.53 1.71 1.66 1.55 1.49 1.39 1.35 1.32 1.27
VIETNAM -0.70 0.87 -0.46 0.49 0.95 0.31 0.15 0.17 0.06 0.04 -0.02
OAFRICA 0.29 -0.05 0.08 -0.13 -0.63 -0.20 0.09 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.20
OASIA -0.31 -0.47 -0.40 -0.57 -0.80 -0.53 -0.38 -0.26 -0.27 -0.24 -0.25
OCARIBBEAN 0.63 0.74 0.82 0.83 0.71 0.78 0.79 0.87 0.81 0.84 0.82
OEUROPE 0.00 -0.44 -0.17 -0.44 -0.81 -0.45 -0.25 -0.11 -0.19 -0.11 -0.11
OMIDDLE EAST 0.06 0.29 -0.19 -1.06 -1.52 -0.17 0.32 0.77 1.21 0.81 0.74
OOCEANIA 2.92 0.70 1.24 0.38 0.00 0.50 0.69 0.72 0.90 0.85 0.82
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Appendix Table 9: Scenario Percent Changes in LGW Production 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA 2.58 0.91 2.49 1.32 1.14 1.61 1.57 2.35 2.33 2.27 2.24
AUSTRALIA 1.81 1.37 1.46 0.97 0.43 0.93 1.23 1.51 1.30 1.31 1.21
BANGLADESH 0.95 0.93 0.91 0.88 0.84 0.82 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.70 0.67
BENIN 0.82 0.70 0.65 0.45 0.15 0.42 0.58 0.70 0.68 0.64 0.59
BOLIVIA 1.12 1.04 0.83 0.94 0.92 0.86 0.83 0.81 0.74 0.74 0.70
BRAZIL 0.78 1.10 1.40 1.01 0.71 0.80 0.91 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.79
BURKINA FASO 1.65 1.08 1.09 0.80 0.71 0.88 0.83 1.01 0.63 0.84 0.78
CAMBODIA 1.50 1.42 0.77 1.17 1.01 1.14 1.24 0.73 0.59 0.69 0.68
CAMEROON 6.61 4.30 4.27 3.07 2.79 2.10 3.91 3.95 3.84 3.82 3.76
CANADA 1.84 1.51 1.60 1.43 1.35 1.33 1.39 1.49 1.50 1.38 1.36
CHILE 1.22 1.20 0.84 0.89 0.69 0.68 0.83 0.58 0.55 0.56 0.51
CHINA -0.03 -0.15 -0.02 -0.17 -0.30 -0.21 -0.28 -0.33 -0.15 -0.33 -0.35
COLOMBIA 1.10 1.32 1.32 1.16 1.11 1.08 1.04 1.07 1.19 0.97 0.94
COSTARICA 2.00 1.91 1.80 1.83 1.83 1.74 1.75 1.70 1.63 1.49 1.42
COTE D'IVOIRE 4.67 3.93 3.09 2.90 2.42 2.64 2.84 4.77 4.84 4.48 4.40
CUBA 0.79 -0.64 0.45 -0.15 -0.72 -0.04 0.23 0.47 0.18 0.51 0.52
ECUADOR 1.39 1.39 1.38 1.37 1.34 1.33 1.32 1.31 1.27 1.26 1.23
EGYPT 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ELSALVADOR 1.77 1.82 1.75 1.77 1.80 1.76 1.76 1.76 1.73 1.67 1.63
EU 0.71 0.66 0.49 0.13 -0.12 -0.09 -0.91 -1.01 -0.03 -1.02 -1.72
GAMBIA 1.99 0.95 0.58 1.11 0.52 1.11 1.50 1.92 1.79 1.87 1.81
GHANA 6.72 4.61 3.78 3.25 2.73 3.17 3.14 3.52 3.66 3.22 3.15
GUATEMALA 2.99 2.88 2.84 2.83 2.81 2.78 2.78 2.78 2.74 2.67 2.63
GUINEA 3.00 3.20 2.86 2.62 2.30 2.48 2.53 2.62 2.56 2.55 2.50
GUINEA BISSAU 1.41 1.21 1.20 1.01 0.59 0.97 1.20 1.33 1.31 1.28 1.23
GUYANA 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.17
HAITI -0.50 0.56 1.05 0.76 -0.08 0.40 0.55 0.82 0.60 0.79 0.81
HONDURAS 2.92 2.64 2.58 2.57 2.56 2.48 2.46 2.44 2.38 2.30 2.24
HONG KONG 0.70 -2.12 -0.44 -2.09 -3.47 -2.03 -1.41 -0.96 -1.59 -0.87 -0.88
INDIA 1.11 0.97 1.15 1.21 1.26 1.08 0.91 0.78 0.68 0.71 0.70
INDONESIA 0.82 0.68 0.84 0.76 0.67 0.62 0.67 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.37
IRAN 0.76 1.27 1.34 1.50 1.37 1.43 1.50 1.52 1.82 1.49 1.46
IRAQ 7.41 4.88 3.91 2.89 3.43 3.26 2.97 3.00 3.63 2.74 2.63
JAPAN 0.24 0.66 0.81 1.26 2.55 1.80 0.58 0.83 3.63 3.51 4.16
LAOS 0.72 0.71 0.69 0.66 0.54 0.60 0.58 0.63 0.60 0.56 0.53
LIBERIA 3.12 1.39 0.94 0.52 -0.11 0.71 1.26 1.70 1.80 1.68 1.60
MALAYSIA 1.80 0.93 2.58 1.38 1.28 1.69 1.81 1.78 1.91 1.90 1.87
MALI 3.84 3.36 3.26 2.89 2.98 3.15 2.86 2.80 2.70 2.71 2.67
MEXICO 3.02 2.16 1.99 2.03 1.87 1.85 1.92 1.74 1.64 1.65 1.60
MYANMAR 2.83 2.37 2.10 2.05 1.78 1.56 1.71 1.45 1.62 1.46 1.43
NICARAGUA 2.88 2.91 2.17 2.46 2.45 2.42 2.43 2.42 2.39 2.32 2.28
NIGER 3.67 3.50 3.25 2.87 2.59 2.85 3.03 3.20 3.20 3.14 3.09
NIGERIA 7.40 8.58 4.71 2.87 3.19 3.39 4.14 5.39 5.26 5.04 4.88
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Appendix Appendix Table 9: Continued 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
PAKISTAN 0.98 2.64 1.42 0.17 3.00 1.28 0.43 0.67 0.00 0.51 0.52
PANAMA 1.77 1.23 0.91 1.02 1.05 0.88 0.81 0.77 0.67 0.64 0.59
PARAGUAY -1.70 -1.73 -2.73 -2.10 -2.24 -2.47 -2.38 -2.38 -2.96 -2.79 -3.00
PERU 0.52 0.55 0.48 0.50 0.46 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.30 0.32 0.29
PHILIPPINES 2.36 1.99 2.17 1.93 1.93 2.09 1.98 2.02 1.99 1.97 1.95
RUSSIA 0.80 -1.52 -0.40 -2.11 -3.40 -1.40 -0.76 0.17 -0.35 0.13 0.08
SAUDI ARABIA -1.20 -0.10 -0.64 -1.41 -2.96 -1.39 -0.36 0.56 0.69 0.52 0.38
SENEGAL 3.64 3.49 3.24 3.10 3.13 2.59 2.68 3.46 3.24 2.69 2.66
SIERRA LEONE 5.07 4.27 3.10 3.04 1.85 3.91 2.99 2.57 2.51 2.50 2.46
SINGAPORE 0.19 2.15 -0.06 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.90 1.22 1.88 1.18 1.06
SOUTH KOREA -0.79 -0.35 -0.78 -0.70 -0.86 -0.55 -0.30 -0.10 0.05 -0.07 -0.09
SOUTH AFRICA 2.03 1.68 1.14 0.52 -0.14 1.08 1.82 2.34 2.64 2.47 2.40
SRILANKA 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.26 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12
SURINAME 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.41 0.40 0.39
TAIWAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TANZANIA 5.06 4.51 4.54 4.34 3.56 3.98 4.15 4.15 4.08 3.97 3.84
THAILAND 0.17 -0.22 -0.21 -0.58 -1.38 -0.54 -0.04 0.30 0.16 0.29 0.24
TOGO 1.12 0.64 0.77 0.35 -0.25 0.36 0.69 0.93 0.85 0.88 0.82
TURKEY 3.74 1.34 0.67 0.42 0.35 0.44 0.86 0.50 -0.12 -0.36 -0.71
UAE 3.15 2.37 0.49 -1.00 -0.13 0.02 0.36 0.76 0.99 0.76 0.63
URUGUAY 1.73 1.64 1.45 1.56 1.44 2.70 2.80 2.87 3.24 2.80 2.75
USA 3.26 1.12 0.99 0.78 0.96 1.16 1.56 1.63 1.80 2.06 2.19
VENEZUELA 1.52 1.52 1.52 1.70 1.65 1.54 1.48 1.38 1.33 1.30 1.25
VIETNAM -0.70 0.87 -0.46 0.49 0.95 0.31 0.15 0.18 0.07 0.05 -0.01
OAFRICA 0.28 -0.05 0.08 -0.13 -0.64 -0.20 0.08 0.23 0.23 0.22 0.18
OASIA -0.31 -0.47 -0.40 -0.57 -0.80 -0.53 -0.37 -0.26 -0.26 -0.24 -0.24
OCARIBBEAN 0.64 0.76 0.84 0.85 0.74 0.81 0.83 0.92 0.86 0.90 0.89
OEUROPE 0.00 -0.44 -0.18 -0.44 -0.82 -0.46 -0.26 -0.13 -0.22 -0.15 -0.15
OMIDDLE EAST 0.06 0.29 -0.18 -1.06 -1.52 -0.17 0.32 0.77 1.20 0.79 0.70
OOCEANIA 2.87 0.64 1.16 0.29 -0.11 0.36 0.51 0.50 0.66 0.56 0.50
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Appendix Table 10: Benchmark Percent Changes in MGW Production 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AUSTRALIA 0.60 1.43 1.92 2.38 2.25 2.13 2.18 2.02 1.65 1.81 1.79
BANGLADESH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BENIN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BOLIVIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BRAZIL 1.13 0.59 0.50 0.48 0.54 0.50 0.56 0.49 0.40 0.38 0.36
BURKINA FASO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CAMBODIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CAMEROON 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CANADA 1.69 1.62 1.54 1.54 1.53 1.43 1.47 1.51 1.53 1.43 1.44
CHILE 0.61 0.87 0.88 0.84 0.72 0.74 0.72 0.74 0.67 0.66 0.62
CHINA -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 -0.17 -0.15 -0.20 -0.25 -0.14 -0.26 -0.28
COLOMBIA 1.17 0.97 0.91 0.88 0.89 0.84 0.80 0.75 0.72 0.70 0.67
COSTARICA 2.73 2.47 2.43 2.42 2.45 2.41 2.39 2.37 2.34 2.13 2.05
COTE D'IVOIRE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CUBA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ECUADOR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EGYPT 2.28 0.65 1.32 1.32 1.31 1.48 1.38 1.34 1.06 1.15 1.13
ELSALVADOR 1.76 1.84 1.78 1.79 1.82 1.79 1.79 1.80 1.77 1.70 1.67
EU 0.75 0.99 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.81 0.68 0.67 0.88 0.80 0.79
GAMBIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GHANA 3.80 6.12 4.09 3.68 3.39 2.94 2.85 2.65 2.57 2.34 2.22
GUATEMALA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GUINEA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GUINEA BISSAU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GUYANA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HAITI 2.62 2.52 2.50 2.49 2.08 2.06 2.04 1.97 1.97 1.95 1.94
HONDURAS 3.04 2.76 2.71 2.70 2.69 2.63 2.60 2.58 2.54 2.45 2.40
HONG KONG 3.39 0.10 -1.01 -0.89 -0.17 -0.61 -0.01 0.13 -1.47 0.06 0.05
INDIA 0.93 0.81 0.72 0.66 0.61 0.67 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.66 0.63
INDONESIA 0.67 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.49 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.37 0.35
IRAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IRAQ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
JAPAN -0.37 -0.70 -0.65 -0.77 -0.78 -0.85 -0.80 -0.77 -0.82 -0.75 -0.76
LAOS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LIBERIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MALAYSIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MALI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MEXICO 2.58 2.33 2.20 2.18 2.11 2.08 2.08 1.98 2.01 1.96 1.95
MYANMAR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NICARAGUA 2.98 2.97 2.18 2.51 2.50 2.47 2.47 2.48 2.44 2.36 2.32
NIGER 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NIGERIA 4.10 3.66 3.53 3.44 3.44 3.35 3.29 3.19 3.17 3.10 3.04
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Appendix Appendix Table 10: Continued 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
PAKISTAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PANAMA 3.37 3.06 2.90 2.80 2.63 2.51 2.42 2.32 2.23 2.14 2.10
PARAGUAY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PERU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PHILIPPINES 2.45 2.11 2.07 2.03 2.04 2.02 2.03 1.99 1.97 1.95 1.93
RUSSIA 0.55 0.62 0.57 0.55 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.38 0.42 0.42
SAUDI ARABIA 2.30 1.39 1.42 1.30 1.27 1.27 1.19 1.13 1.07 1.06 1.04
SENEGAL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SIERRA LEONE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SINGAPORE 1.59 1.44 1.30 1.13 0.97 0.84 0.75 0.71 0.70 0.71 0.70
SOUTH KOREA -0.23 -0.15 -0.26 -0.35 -0.28 -0.30 -0.15 -0.16 -0.03 -0.17 -0.16
SOUTH AFRICA 2.12 2.39 2.34 2.32 2.30 2.37 2.36 2.38 2.37 2.38 2.37
SRILANKA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SURINAME 0.76 0.64 0.60 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.52 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.45
TAIWAN -0.81 -0.73 -0.69 -0.65 -0.60 -0.54 -0.54 -0.53 -0.48 -0.47 -0.48
TANZANIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
THAILAND 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TOGO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TURKEY 1.18 2.73 1.96 1.98 1.92 2.05 1.72 1.81 1.77 1.69 1.69
UAE 1.61 -6.73 -4.78 -5.87 -6.70 -5.40 -6.76 -7.07 -9.14 -6.85 -5.98
URUGUAY 1.93 2.06 2.01 1.95 1.76 1.73 1.63 1.63 1.60 1.59 1.56
USA 1.85 2.58 1.63 1.45 1.43 1.18 1.31 1.25 1.14 1.22 1.19
VENEZUELA 1.62 1.56 1.55 1.75 1.71 1.63 1.56 1.45 1.42 1.38 1.33
VIETNAM -0.08 -0.41 -0.44 -0.57 -0.62 -0.65 -0.75 -0.81 -0.82 -0.76 -0.78
OAFRICA 0.99 0.09 0.16 -0.12 -0.47 -0.63 -1.47 -2.52 -5.77 -6.78 -8.83
OASIA -0.15 -0.18 -0.23 -0.21 -0.21 -0.20 -0.15 -0.11 -0.23 -0.12 -0.12
OCARIBBEAN 1.23 1.21 1.29 1.31 1.31 1.30 1.28 1.29 1.29 1.29 1.28
OEUROPE -0.43 8.12 4.27 3.53 2.78 1.93 1.08 0.94 1.68 1.18 1.11
OMIDDLE EAST -0.41 -9.45 -6.24 -6.34 -6.17 -4.67 -5.25 -5.08 -5.90 -4.24 -3.54
OOCEANIA 2.17 1.50 1.35 1.23 1.28 1.22 1.22 1.17 1.20 1.16 1.11
98 
Appendix Table 11: Scenario Percent Changes in MGW Production 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AUSTRALIA 0.61 1.43 1.93 2.39 2.26 2.14 2.20 2.04 1.67 1.83 1.81
BANGLADESH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BENIN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BOLIVIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BRAZIL 1.08 0.53 0.42 0.38 0.42 0.35 0.37 0.24 0.08 -0.01 -0.13
BURKINA FASO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CAMBODIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CAMEROON 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CANADA 1.69 1.61 1.53 1.53 1.51 1.41 1.45 1.48 1.50 1.39 1.39
CHILE 0.62 0.88 0.90 0.86 0.75 0.78 0.78 0.81 0.75 0.75 0.72
CHINA -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.10 -0.17 -0.15 -0.20 -0.25 -0.14 -0.26 -0.28
COLOMBIA 1.16 0.96 0.90 0.87 0.87 0.82 0.78 0.72 0.69 0.66 0.62
COSTARICA 2.72 2.46 2.42 2.41 2.44 2.39 2.37 2.35 2.31 2.10 2.01
COTE D'IVOIRE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CUBA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ECUADOR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EGYPT 2.29 0.65 1.32 1.32 1.31 1.48 1.38 1.34 1.06 1.15 1.13
ELSALVADOR 1.76 1.84 1.78 1.79 1.82 1.79 1.79 1.80 1.77 1.71 1.67
EU 0.53 0.74 0.64 0.63 0.60 0.46 0.26 0.24 0.53 0.46 0.49
GAMBIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GHANA 3.75 6.09 4.06 3.66 3.37 2.91 2.81 2.62 2.54 2.30 2.17
GUATEMALA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GUINEA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GUINEA BISSAU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GUYANA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HAITI 2.61 2.52 2.50 2.48 2.08 2.05 2.03 1.96 1.95 1.93 1.92
HONDURAS 3.04 2.76 2.71 2.69 2.68 2.62 2.59 2.57 2.53 2.44 2.38
HONG KONG 3.27 -0.04 -1.19 -1.11 -0.43 -0.94 -0.44 -0.38 -2.08 -0.63 -0.73
INDIA 0.92 0.81 0.72 0.65 0.60 0.66 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.64 0.61
INDONESIA 0.66 0.49 0.47 0.44 0.47 0.44 0.40 0.39 0.37 0.33 0.30
IRAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IRAQ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
JAPAN -0.37 -0.70 -0.65 -0.77 -0.78 -0.85 -0.80 -0.77 -0.81 -0.75 -0.76
LAOS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LIBERIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MALAYSIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MALI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MEXICO 2.58 2.33 2.20 2.17 2.10 2.07 2.07 1.97 2.00 1.95 1.94
MYANMAR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NICARAGUA 2.98 2.97 2.19 2.51 2.50 2.47 2.48 2.48 2.44 2.37 2.33
NIGER 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NIGERIA 4.08 3.64 3.50 3.41 3.41 3.31 3.24 3.12 3.10 3.01 2.94
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Appendix Appendix Table 11: Continued 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
PAKISTAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PANAMA 3.37 3.06 2.89 2.80 2.63 2.51 2.42 2.31 2.22 2.13 2.09
PARAGUAY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PERU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PHILIPPINES 2.44 2.10 2.05 2.01 2.02 1.99 1.99 1.94 1.92 1.89 1.86
RUSSIA 0.55 0.62 0.57 0.55 0.47 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.37 0.41 0.40
SAUDI ARABIA 2.29 1.37 1.40 1.27 1.24 1.23 1.14 1.06 0.99 0.97 0.92
SENEGAL 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SIERRA LEONE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SINGAPORE 1.59 1.44 1.30 1.13 0.97 0.84 0.74 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.70
SOUTH KOREA -0.23 -0.15 -0.26 -0.35 -0.28 -0.30 -0.15 -0.16 -0.03 -0.17 -0.16
SOUTH AFRICA 2.12 2.39 2.35 2.32 2.31 2.38 2.38 2.40 2.39 2.40 2.40
SRILANKA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SURINAME 0.76 0.64 0.59 0.57 0.57 0.53 0.51 0.47 0.47 0.45 0.43
TAIWAN -0.81 -0.73 -0.69 -0.65 -0.60 -0.54 -0.54 -0.52 -0.47 -0.46 -0.47
TANZANIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
THAILAND 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TOGO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TURKEY 1.18 2.72 1.95 1.96 1.90 2.02 1.69 1.77 1.72 1.63 1.60
UAE 1.65 -6.65 -4.67 -5.71 -6.51 -5.18 -6.50 -6.80 -8.94 -6.66 -5.81
URUGUAY 1.94 2.07 2.02 1.96 1.77 1.75 1.66 1.66 1.63 1.63 1.60
USA 2.01 2.75 1.81 1.65 1.64 1.41 1.57 1.50 1.34 1.40 1.33
VENEZUELA 1.61 1.55 1.54 1.74 1.70 1.61 1.54 1.43 1.40 1.36 1.30
VIETNAM -0.09 -0.42 -0.45 -0.59 -0.64 -0.67 -0.78 -0.85 -0.86 -0.81 -0.84
OAFRICA 0.99 0.10 0.16 -0.11 -0.45 -0.59 -1.38 -2.37 -5.50 -6.39 -8.28
OASIA -0.15 -0.18 -0.23 -0.21 -0.21 -0.20 -0.15 -0.11 -0.23 -0.12 -0.12
OCARIBBEAN 1.23 1.21 1.28 1.31 1.31 1.30 1.28 1.28 1.29 1.28 1.27
OEUROPE 0.02 8.59 4.76 4.04 3.35 2.61 2.02 2.03 2.67 2.35 2.36
OMIDDLE EAST -0.36 -9.40 -6.17 -6.26 -6.09 -4.58 -5.16 -5.02 -5.91 -4.26 -3.59
OOCEANIA 2.15 1.48 1.32 1.20 1.23 1.17 1.15 1.08 1.10 1.04 0.98
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Appendix Table 12: Benchmark Percent Changes in Consumption Volume 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA 1.14 1.16 1.18 1.14 1.10 1.11 1.08 1.06 1.03 1.01 1.00
AUSTRALIA 1.81 1.84 2.00 2.11 2.08 1.99 2.01 1.94 1.81 1.83 1.81
BANGLADESH 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.87 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.69 0.66
BENIN 2.83 2.77 2.72 2.65 2.58 2.49 2.40 2.33 2.25 2.19 2.13
BOLIVIA 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.89 1.84 1.81 1.78 1.76 1.73 1.70 1.68
BRAZIL 0.62 0.65 0.66 0.59 0.54 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.44 0.41 0.38
BURKINA FASO 3.39 3.33 3.20 3.17 3.13 3.03 2.99 2.92 2.92 2.85 2.81
CAMBODIA 0.63 0.60 0.34 0.45 0.41 0.36 0.31 0.13 0.08 0.03 -0.02
CAMEROON 2.32 2.36 2.19 2.18 2.15 1.88 1.89 1.85 1.82 1.78 1.76
CANADA 1.62 1.62 1.56 1.57 1.55 1.44 1.47 1.51 1.52 1.42 1.43
CHILE 1.23 1.20 1.20 1.15 1.13 1.12 1.10 1.09 1.06 1.04 1.01
CHINA 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.17 -0.16 -0.20 -0.25 -0.17 -0.27 -0.29
COLOMBIA 1.05 1.03 1.00 0.94 0.91 0.87 0.84 0.81 0.83 0.75 0.72
COSTARICA 2.54 2.41 2.39 2.38 2.38 2.35 2.34 2.33 2.29 2.09 2.01
COTE D'IVOIRE 2.18 2.26 2.02 1.95 1.98 1.71 1.62 1.61 1.59 1.54 1.53
CUBA 1.37 1.61 2.08 2.27 2.24 2.22 2.19 2.18 2.17 2.13 2.13
ECUADOR 1.62 1.55 1.52 1.49 1.46 1.43 1.40 1.38 1.35 1.31 1.28
EGYPT 2.44 1.53 1.81 1.73 1.65 1.73 1.63 1.58 1.36 1.41 1.39
ELSALVADOR 1.80 1.84 1.78 1.79 1.83 1.80 1.79 1.80 1.77 1.71 1.67
EU 0.79 0.76 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.71 0.67 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.66
GAMBIA 3.42 3.42 3.40 3.34 3.32 3.28 3.24 3.20 3.18 3.14 3.10
GHANA 2.87 2.68 2.48 2.46 2.43 2.36 2.30 2.26 2.21 2.14 2.09
GUATEMALA 3.06 2.93 2.90 2.90 2.90 2.86 2.85 2.84 2.80 2.73 2.68
GUINEA 2.75 3.51 2.89 2.71 2.38 2.27 2.20 2.13 2.09 2.03 1.99
GUINEA BISSAU 2.16 2.15 2.17 2.16 2.15 2.12 2.08 2.05 2.02 2.01 1.99
GUYANA 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17
HAITI 2.55 2.52 2.49 2.49 2.07 2.05 2.03 1.97 1.96 1.94 1.93
HONDURAS 3.02 2.75 2.70 2.69 2.68 2.62 2.59 2.57 2.53 2.44 2.39
HONG KONG -0.16 -0.13 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.17 -0.20 -0.23 -0.27 -0.27 -0.30
INDIA 0.93 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.86 0.78 0.74 0.69 0.68 0.66
INDONESIA 0.71 0.64 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.59 0.61 0.43 0.40 0.38 0.36
IRAN 1.59 1.57 1.58 1.63 1.66 1.55 1.47 1.43 1.43 1.34 1.32
IRAQ 3.19 3.52 3.16 3.09 3.04 2.99 2.94 2.88 2.78 2.71 2.64
JAPAN -0.57 -0.70 -0.65 -0.72 -0.73 -0.76 -0.75 -0.74 -0.74 -0.73 -0.74
LAOS 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.64 0.54 0.59 0.56 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.52
LIBERIA 2.91 2.79 2.75 2.69 2.64 2.51 2.40 2.31 2.22 2.16 2.10
MALAYSIA 1.72 1.82 1.81 1.77 1.81 1.75 1.70 1.62 1.61 1.54 1.48
MALI 3.44 3.18 3.07 2.86 2.89 2.95 2.76 2.70 2.63 2.61 2.57
MEXICO 2.57 2.33 2.20 2.18 2.11 2.08 2.08 1.97 2.00 1.96 1.94
MYANMAR 2.74 1.92 1.76 1.59 1.49 1.38 1.32 1.23 1.23 1.13 1.08
NICARAGUA 2.96 2.95 2.19 2.49 2.49 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.43 2.35 2.31
NIGER 4.58 4.37 4.17 3.97 3.92 3.88 3.84 3.79 3.75 3.70 3.66
NIGERIA 3.77 3.73 3.59 3.48 3.41 3.33 3.26 3.21 3.14 3.08 3.02
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2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
PAKISTAN 1.91 1.98 1.93 1.89 1.97 1.86 1.78 1.75 1.70 1.65 1.61
PANAMA 3.31 3.04 2.89 2.80 2.61 2.50 2.41 2.31 2.22 2.13 2.09
PARAGUAY 1.89 1.91 1.86 1.79 1.69 1.65 1.62 1.58 1.56 1.52 1.49
PERU 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.89 0.87 0.84 0.80 0.77
PHILIPPINES 2.24 2.12 2.16 2.07 2.09 2.12 2.04 2.04 2.02 1.98 1.95
RUSSIA 0.74 0.80 0.75 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.57 0.57
SAUDI ARABIA 1.97 2.00 1.94 1.88 1.85 1.63 1.48 1.37 1.28 1.21 1.15
SENEGAL 2.88 2.84 2.78 2.75 2.72 2.63 2.55 2.49 2.43 2.38 2.33
SIERRA LEONE 2.83 2.73 2.56 2.46 2.29 2.41 2.29 2.20 2.18 2.14 2.11
SINGAPORE 1.57 1.50 1.35 1.22 1.08 0.91 0.79 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.73
SOUTH KOREA -0.26 -0.21 -0.26 -0.33 -0.27 -0.27 -0.17 -0.19 -0.03 -0.19 -0.18
SOUTH AFRICA 2.24 2.33 2.40 2.43 2.48 2.50 2.45 2.43 2.42 2.43 2.43
SRILANKA 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.29 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.12
SURINAME 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.39
TAIWAN -0.78 -0.73 -0.69 -0.65 -0.60 -0.55 -0.55 -0.54 -0.50 -0.49 -0.49
TANZANIA 4.14 4.19 4.08 4.02 3.99 3.94 3.90 3.87 3.85 3.80 3.72
THAILAND -0.44 -0.41 -0.46 -0.48 -0.51 -0.54 -0.56 -0.59 -0.62 -0.64 -0.66
TOGO 2.79 2.76 2.72 2.69 2.65 2.56 2.48 2.42 2.36 2.30 2.25
TURKEY 1.98 2.16 1.97 1.99 1.95 1.99 1.85 1.81 1.81 1.77 1.77
UAE 2.38 2.69 2.56 2.37 2.24 1.99 1.84 1.76 1.70 1.68 1.66
URUGUAY 2.15 2.16 2.11 2.04 1.89 1.88 1.77 1.73 1.75 1.71 1.68
USA 1.05 1.08 1.04 1.02 1.07 1.05 1.07 1.06 1.03 1.06 1.00
VENEZUELA 1.51 1.54 1.55 1.74 1.68 1.61 1.54 1.44 1.40 1.37 1.31
VIETNAM -0.41 -0.22 -0.39 -0.36 -0.37 -0.50 -0.66 -0.72 -0.71 -0.70 -0.73
OAFRICA 0.97 1.18 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.01 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.89 0.85
OASIA -0.19 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
OCARIBBEAN 1.18 1.20 1.28 1.30 1.29 1.28 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.26
OEUROPE 0.74 0.89 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.83 0.81 0.75 0.75 0.70 0.74
OMIDDLE EAST 0.46 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.65 0.56 0.45 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.35
OOCEANIA 1.67 1.56 1.41 1.34 1.32 1.26 1.22 1.20 1.19 1.15 1.09
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Appendix Table 13: Scenario Percent Changes in Consumption Volume 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA 1.14 1.16 1.18 1.14 1.10 1.11 1.08 1.06 1.03 1.01 1.00
AUSTRALIA 1.81 1.84 2.00 2.10 2.07 1.99 2.00 1.93 1.80 1.82 1.80
BANGLADESH 0.94 0.93 0.90 0.87 0.84 0.81 0.78 0.75 0.72 0.69 0.66
BENIN 2.83 2.77 2.72 2.65 2.58 2.49 2.41 2.33 2.26 2.20 2.14
BOLIVIA 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.89 1.84 1.81 1.78 1.76 1.73 1.70 1.68
BRAZIL 0.62 0.65 0.66 0.59 0.54 0.53 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.42 0.39
BURKINA FASO 3.39 3.33 3.20 3.17 3.13 3.03 2.99 2.92 2.92 2.85 2.81
CAMBODIA 0.63 0.60 0.34 0.45 0.41 0.37 0.32 0.14 0.09 0.04 0.00
CAMEROON 2.32 2.36 2.19 2.18 2.15 1.88 1.90 1.86 1.83 1.79 1.77
CANADA 1.61 1.62 1.56 1.57 1.55 1.44 1.46 1.50 1.51 1.41 1.41
CHILE 1.23 1.20 1.20 1.15 1.13 1.12 1.10 1.09 1.06 1.03 1.01
CHINA 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.17 -0.16 -0.20 -0.25 -0.17 -0.27 -0.29
COLOMBIA 1.05 1.03 1.00 0.94 0.91 0.87 0.84 0.82 0.83 0.75 0.72
COSTARICA 2.54 2.41 2.39 2.38 2.37 2.35 2.34 2.33 2.29 2.09 2.01
COTE D'IVOIRE 2.18 2.27 2.03 1.96 1.99 1.72 1.64 1.63 1.62 1.57 1.56
CUBA 1.37 1.61 2.08 2.27 2.24 2.22 2.19 2.18 2.17 2.13 2.12
ECUADOR 1.62 1.55 1.52 1.49 1.46 1.43 1.41 1.39 1.35 1.32 1.29
EGYPT 2.44 1.53 1.80 1.73 1.65 1.72 1.63 1.57 1.35 1.41 1.38
ELSALVADOR 1.79 1.84 1.78 1.79 1.82 1.79 1.79 1.79 1.77 1.70 1.66
EU 0.80 0.78 0.75 0.77 0.80 0.75 0.72 0.72 0.76 0.75 0.76
GAMBIA 3.42 3.42 3.40 3.34 3.32 3.28 3.24 3.20 3.18 3.14 3.10
GHANA 2.87 2.68 2.49 2.47 2.43 2.36 2.30 2.26 2.22 2.15 2.10
GUATEMALA 3.06 2.93 2.89 2.90 2.90 2.86 2.84 2.83 2.79 2.72 2.68
GUINEA 2.75 3.51 2.89 2.72 2.38 2.27 2.21 2.14 2.10 2.04 2.00
GUINEA BISSAU 2.16 2.15 2.17 2.16 2.15 2.12 2.08 2.05 2.02 2.01 1.99
GUYANA 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17
HAITI 2.55 2.52 2.49 2.48 2.07 2.05 2.03 1.97 1.95 1.94 1.92
HONDURAS 3.02 2.75 2.70 2.69 2.67 2.62 2.58 2.56 2.52 2.43 2.38
HONG KONG -0.16 -0.13 -0.14 -0.13 -0.13 -0.17 -0.20 -0.23 -0.27 -0.27 -0.30
INDIA 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.79 0.75 0.70 0.69 0.67
INDONESIA 0.71 0.65 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.59 0.62 0.44 0.41 0.39 0.36
IRAN 1.59 1.56 1.58 1.63 1.66 1.54 1.47 1.42 1.43 1.33 1.31
IRAQ 3.19 3.52 3.16 3.09 3.04 2.99 2.94 2.88 2.78 2.71 2.64
JAPAN -0.57 -0.70 -0.65 -0.72 -0.73 -0.76 -0.75 -0.74 -0.74 -0.73 -0.74
LAOS 0.70 0.69 0.67 0.64 0.54 0.59 0.56 0.61 0.58 0.55 0.52
LIBERIA 2.91 2.80 2.75 2.69 2.64 2.52 2.41 2.31 2.23 2.17 2.11
MALAYSIA 1.73 1.83 1.82 1.78 1.82 1.76 1.71 1.64 1.63 1.55 1.50
MALI 3.44 3.18 3.07 2.86 2.89 2.95 2.76 2.70 2.63 2.61 2.57
MEXICO 2.57 2.33 2.20 2.18 2.10 2.07 2.07 1.97 2.00 1.95 1.93
MYANMAR 2.74 1.92 1.76 1.59 1.49 1.38 1.32 1.23 1.23 1.13 1.08
NICARAGUA 2.96 2.95 2.19 2.50 2.49 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.43 2.35 2.32
NIGER 4.58 4.37 4.17 3.97 3.92 3.88 3.84 3.79 3.75 3.70 3.66
NIGERIA 3.77 3.73 3.59 3.48 3.41 3.33 3.27 3.22 3.15 3.09 3.03
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Appendix Appendix Table 13: Continued 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
PAKISTAN 1.91 1.98 1.93 1.90 1.97 1.87 1.79 1.75 1.70 1.66 1.62
PANAMA 3.31 3.04 2.89 2.80 2.61 2.50 2.41 2.31 2.22 2.13 2.09
PARAGUAY 1.89 1.91 1.86 1.79 1.69 1.65 1.62 1.59 1.56 1.52 1.49
PERU 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.90 0.87 0.85 0.81 0.78
PHILIPPINES 2.24 2.13 2.16 2.08 2.09 2.13 2.05 2.05 2.03 1.99 1.97
RUSSIA 0.74 0.80 0.75 0.75 0.70 0.65 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.57 0.57
SAUDI ARABIA 1.97 2.01 1.94 1.89 1.85 1.64 1.49 1.38 1.29 1.22 1.16
SENEGAL 2.88 2.84 2.78 2.75 2.72 2.63 2.56 2.50 2.44 2.39 2.34
SIERRA LEONE 2.83 2.73 2.56 2.46 2.29 2.41 2.29 2.20 2.17 2.14 2.11
SINGAPORE 1.57 1.50 1.36 1.22 1.08 0.91 0.80 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74
SOUTH KOREA -0.26 -0.21 -0.26 -0.33 -0.27 -0.28 -0.18 -0.20 -0.03 -0.19 -0.18
SOUTH AFRICA 2.24 2.33 2.40 2.43 2.49 2.50 2.46 2.44 2.43 2.45 2.45
SRILANKA 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.13
SURINAME 0.57 0.57 0.54 0.52 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.40
TAIWAN -0.78 -0.73 -0.69 -0.65 -0.60 -0.55 -0.55 -0.54 -0.51 -0.49 -0.49
TANZANIA 4.14 4.19 4.08 4.02 4.00 3.95 3.91 3.88 3.85 3.80 3.73
THAILAND -0.44 -0.41 -0.46 -0.48 -0.51 -0.54 -0.56 -0.59 -0.61 -0.63 -0.66
TOGO 2.79 2.77 2.72 2.70 2.66 2.57 2.49 2.43 2.37 2.31 2.26
TURKEY 1.98 2.16 1.97 1.99 1.95 1.99 1.85 1.81 1.81 1.77 1.78
UAE 2.39 2.70 2.56 2.37 2.24 2.00 1.85 1.77 1.71 1.70 1.68
URUGUAY 2.16 2.17 2.12 2.05 1.89 1.89 1.78 1.74 1.76 1.72 1.69
USA 1.05 1.08 1.04 1.02 1.07 1.05 1.07 1.06 1.03 1.05 1.00
VENEZUELA 1.50 1.54 1.55 1.74 1.68 1.60 1.54 1.44 1.40 1.36 1.31
VIETNAM -0.41 -0.21 -0.39 -0.36 -0.36 -0.49 -0.65 -0.71 -0.70 -0.69 -0.72
OAFRICA 0.97 1.18 1.07 1.07 1.09 1.01 0.99 0.96 0.96 0.89 0.86
OASIA -0.19 -0.17 -0.16 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
OCARIBBEAN 1.18 1.20 1.28 1.30 1.29 1.28 1.27 1.28 1.28 1.27 1.27
OEUROPE 0.74 0.89 0.84 0.84 0.87 0.83 0.81 0.75 0.75 0.70 0.73
OMIDDLE EAST 0.47 0.55 0.56 0.59 0.66 0.56 0.46 0.41 0.38 0.36 0.35
OOCEANIA 1.67 1.56 1.42 1.35 1.32 1.26 1.23 1.21 1.19 1.16 1.10
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Appendix Table 14: Benchmark Percent Changes LGW Retail Consumption Price 
2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA -0.59 -0.30 -0.75 -0.43 -0.43 -0.48 -0.41 -0.49 -0.55 -0.48 -0.49
AUSTRALIA -0.34 -0.42 -0.33 -0.45 -0.57 -0.45 -0.37 -0.27 -0.31 -0.28 -0.28
BANGLADESH -1.23 -1.01 -1.15 -1.18 -1.25 -1.05 -0.94 -0.95 -0.97 -0.97 -0.97
BENIN -0.15 -0.20 -0.21 -0.29 -0.43 -0.28 -0.17 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09
BOLIVIA 0.41 0.38 0.22 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.26 0.27 0.25
BRAZIL -0.48 -0.84 -1.16 -0.79 -0.65 -0.67 -0.67 -0.54 -0.62 -0.55 -0.55
BURKINA FASO 0.27 -0.02 0.03 -0.13 -0.17 -0.03 -0.04 0.10 -0.15 0.02 0.00
CAMBODIA -2.45 -2.39 -1.26 -1.92 -1.90 -1.80 -1.71 -1.02 -1.04 -1.01 -1.00
CAMEROON -0.44 -0.54 -0.45 -0.59 -0.77 -0.51 -0.46 -0.36 -0.39 -0.34 -0.35
CANADA -1.07 -0.28 -0.15 -0.18 -0.44 -0.30 -0.28 -0.16 -0.26 -0.22 -0.23
CHILE -0.36 -0.32 -0.53 -0.36 -0.40 -0.39 -0.32 -0.32 -0.37 -0.32 -0.32
CHINA 0.11 -0.25 -0.54 -0.51 -0.51 -0.52 -0.25 -0.03 -0.81 -0.13 -0.13
COLOMBIA -0.89 -0.90 -0.92 -0.67 -0.81 -0.73 -0.70 -0.78 -1.28 -0.74 -0.75
COSTARICA 0.06 0.32 0.26 0.31 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.26 0.16 0.15 0.12
COTE D'IVOIRE -0.42 -0.62 -0.49 -0.71 -0.92 -0.63 -0.48 -0.45 -0.51 -0.44 -0.45
CUBA 0.01 -0.55 -0.25 -0.50 -0.70 -0.45 -0.35 -0.26 -0.37 -0.24 -0.23
ECUADOR 0.66 0.69 0.72 0.75 0.76 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.86 0.89 0.91
EGYPT -0.60 -0.48 -0.72 -0.92 -1.21 -0.77 -0.46 -0.22 -0.14 -0.19 -0.21
ELSALVADOR -0.90 -0.16 -0.05 -0.06 -0.29 -0.17 -0.17 -0.06 -0.15 -0.12 -0.14
EU -0.33 -0.39 -0.38 -0.47 -0.66 -0.46 -0.22 -0.13 -0.37 -0.29 -0.29
GAMBIA -0.28 -0.48 -0.55 -0.44 -0.55 -0.43 -0.34 -0.25 -0.27 -0.25 -0.26
GHANA -0.71 -0.86 -0.43 -0.71 -0.96 -0.69 -0.55 -0.49 -0.62 -0.44 -0.44
GUATEMALA -0.79 -0.17 -0.09 -0.08 -0.28 -0.18 -0.17 -0.06 -0.15 -0.12 -0.14
GUINEA -0.54 -0.43 -0.60 -0.74 -0.97 -0.75 -0.63 -0.50 -0.60 -0.54 -0.57
GUINEA BISSAU 0.09 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.19 -0.03 0.08 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17
GUYANA 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.15
HAITI -0.74 -0.30 -0.10 -0.22 -0.51 -0.31 -0.26 -0.15 -0.26 -0.19 -0.20
HONDURAS -0.93 -0.15 -0.03 -0.05 -0.29 -0.17 -0.16 -0.05 -0.15 -0.12 -0.14
HONG KONG -0.13 -0.72 -0.32 -0.69 -1.00 -0.67 -0.52 -0.40 -0.52 -0.37 -0.36
INDIA -0.70 -0.55 -0.85 -1.10 -1.44 -0.90 -0.53 -0.24 -0.15 -0.20 -0.23
INDONESIA -1.70 -1.14 -1.69 -1.55 -1.42 -1.07 -1.39 -0.28 -0.31 -0.33 -0.34
IRAN 0.12 -0.06 -0.21 -0.34 -0.38 -0.36 -0.34 -0.28 -0.52 -0.32 -0.33
IRAQ -0.35 -0.27 -0.28 -0.26 -0.29 -0.29 -0.26 -0.24 -0.27 -0.24 -0.24
JAPAN -0.28 -0.27 -0.23 -0.25 -0.26 -0.25 -0.24 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21
LAOS -1.29 -1.25 -1.21 -1.18 -0.76 -1.12 -1.10 -1.44 -1.43 -1.41 -1.39
LIBERIA -0.53 -0.39 -0.57 -0.74 -0.99 -0.62 -0.36 -0.17 -0.11 -0.14 -0.16
MALAYSIA -0.27 -0.61 -0.67 -0.72 -1.03 -0.82 -0.72 -0.54 -0.70 -0.59 -0.59
MALI -2.65 -1.63 -1.53 -0.63 -1.26 -1.96 -1.10 -1.06 -0.95 -1.17 -1.23
MEXICO -1.03 -0.27 -0.15 -0.18 -0.43 -0.30 -0.27 -0.14 -0.17 -0.16 -0.18
MYANMAR -0.49 -1.32 -1.09 -1.44 -1.45 -1.03 -1.04 -0.64 -1.22 -0.76 -0.78
NICARAGUA 0.52 0.35 -0.02 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.20 0.21 0.18
NIGER -0.18 -0.17 -0.18 -0.21 -0.26 -0.20 -0.16 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
NIGERIA -0.75 -0.86 -0.57 -0.48 -0.70 -0.49 -0.42 -0.43 -0.39 -0.40 -0.41
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2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
PAKISTAN -0.30 -0.74 -0.45 -0.38 -1.14 -0.57 -0.24 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 -0.11
PANAMA -0.07 0.05 -0.05 0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 0.00 -0.09 -0.06 -0.08
PARAGUAY -0.32 -0.40 -0.60 -0.40 -0.37 -0.37 -0.34 -0.29 -0.34 -0.29 -0.28
PERU 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.07
PHILIPPINES -0.57 -0.28 -0.40 -0.27 -0.57 -0.61 -0.31 -0.32 -0.42 -0.32 -0.32
RUSSIA -0.33 -0.76 -0.56 -0.88 -1.15 -0.77 -0.59 -0.38 -0.52 -0.39 -0.40
SAUDI ARABIA -0.70 -0.44 -0.53 -0.67 -0.98 -0.63 -0.41 -0.21 -0.18 -0.20 -0.22
SENEGAL -0.46 -0.46 -0.57 -0.67 -0.88 -0.56 -0.37 -0.27 -0.24 -0.21 -0.23
SIERRA LEONE -1.50 -1.35 -0.90 -0.89 -0.47 -1.41 -0.84 -0.52 -0.54 -0.52 -0.52
SINGAPORE -0.39 -0.64 -0.55 -0.86 -1.18 -0.77 -0.52 -0.32 -0.33 -0.29 -0.30
SOUTH KOREA -0.32 -0.41 -0.36 -0.50 -0.64 -0.47 -0.36 -0.26 -0.27 -0.25 -0.25
SOUTH AFRICA -0.41 -0.38 -0.47 -0.60 -0.78 -0.54 -0.37 -0.22 -0.19 -0.20 -0.21
SRILANKA 0.32 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.12
SURINAME 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.28
TAIWAN -0.31 -0.72 -0.38 -0.72 -0.94 -0.71 -0.60 -0.44 -0.52 -0.42 -0.42
TANZANIA -0.72 -0.83 -0.69 -0.65 -0.93 -0.63 -0.43 -0.31 -0.25 -0.23 -0.22
THAILAND -0.32 -0.32 -0.27 -0.29 -0.30 -0.29 -0.28 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25
TOGO -0.16 -0.32 -0.26 -0.41 -0.62 -0.38 -0.24 -0.14 -0.15 -0.13 -0.13
TURKEY -0.68 -0.32 -0.30 -0.35 -0.57 -0.40 -0.25 -0.14 -0.31 -0.25 -0.26
UAE -0.53 -0.53 -0.66 -0.89 -1.21 -0.76 -0.47 -0.25 -0.20 -0.21 -0.23
URUGUAY -0.43 -0.35 -0.42 -0.35 -0.38 -0.54 -0.49 -0.42 -0.54 -0.43 -0.43
USA -1.14 -0.29 -0.15 -0.18 -0.46 -0.31 -0.29 -0.16 -0.26 -0.22 -0.24
VENEZUELA -0.52 -0.20 -0.23 -0.13 -0.23 -0.20 -0.20 -0.12 -0.21 -0.17 -0.18
VIETNAM 0.07 -1.03 -0.31 -0.98 -1.44 -0.90 -0.68 -0.52 -0.71 -0.46 -0.44
OAFRICA -0.13 -0.28 -0.19 -0.29 -0.54 -0.31 -0.18 -0.09 -0.10 -0.08 -0.09
OASIA -0.15 -0.25 -0.21 -0.30 -0.42 -0.27 -0.19 -0.12 -0.14 -0.11 -0.12
OCARIBBEAN 0.02 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.11
OEUROPE -0.17 -0.58 -0.34 -0.56 -0.87 -0.55 -0.37 -0.25 -0.33 -0.25 -0.25
OMIDDLE EAST -0.43 -0.41 -0.49 -0.64 -0.85 -0.57 -0.38 -0.23 -0.20 -0.21 -0.22
OOCEANIA -0.25 -0.44 -0.27 -0.44 -0.59 -0.44 -0.36 -0.29 -0.34 -0.27 -0.27
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2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA -0.59 -0.30 -0.75 -0.43 -0.43 -0.48 -0.41 -0.49 -0.54 -0.48 -0.48
AUSTRALIA -0.34 -0.42 -0.34 -0.46 -0.59 -0.46 -0.38 -0.29 -0.34 -0.32 -0.33
BANGLADESH -1.23 -1.01 -1.15 -1.18 -1.25 -1.05 -0.94 -0.95 -0.97 -0.97 -0.97
BENIN -0.15 -0.20 -0.21 -0.29 -0.43 -0.28 -0.17 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09
BOLIVIA 0.41 0.38 0.22 0.33 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.26 0.27 0.26
BRAZIL -0.48 -0.84 -1.16 -0.79 -0.65 -0.67 -0.67 -0.54 -0.62 -0.55 -0.55
BURKINA FASO 0.27 -0.02 0.03 -0.13 -0.17 -0.03 -0.04 0.10 -0.15 0.02 0.00
CAMBODIA -2.44 -2.39 -1.26 -1.92 -1.90 -1.80 -1.71 -1.02 -1.04 -1.01 -1.00
CAMEROON -0.44 -0.54 -0.45 -0.59 -0.76 -0.50 -0.46 -0.35 -0.39 -0.34 -0.34
CANADA -1.03 -0.23 -0.10 -0.12 -0.36 -0.20 -0.14 0.01 -0.07 0.00 0.02
CHILE -0.36 -0.32 -0.53 -0.36 -0.40 -0.39 -0.33 -0.32 -0.37 -0.32 -0.32
CHINA 0.11 -0.25 -0.54 -0.51 -0.51 -0.52 -0.25 -0.03 -0.81 -0.13 -0.13
COLOMBIA -0.89 -0.89 -0.91 -0.66 -0.80 -0.71 -0.68 -0.76 -1.25 -0.71 -0.72
COSTARICA 0.08 0.34 0.28 0.34 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.32 0.24 0.24 0.22
COTE D'IVOIRE -0.42 -0.62 -0.49 -0.71 -0.92 -0.63 -0.48 -0.45 -0.51 -0.43 -0.44
CUBA 0.01 -0.55 -0.25 -0.50 -0.70 -0.45 -0.35 -0.26 -0.37 -0.24 -0.23
ECUADOR 0.66 0.69 0.72 0.75 0.77 0.80 0.83 0.86 0.87 0.90 0.92
EGYPT -0.59 -0.48 -0.71 -0.92 -1.21 -0.77 -0.46 -0.22 -0.14 -0.18 -0.20
ELSALVADOR -0.86 -0.11 0.01 0.01 -0.21 -0.07 -0.03 0.11 0.04 0.11 0.13
EU -0.46 -0.55 -0.58 -0.71 -0.96 -0.85 -0.74 -0.80 -1.20 -1.34 -1.60
GAMBIA -0.28 -0.48 -0.55 -0.44 -0.55 -0.43 -0.34 -0.25 -0.27 -0.25 -0.25
GHANA -0.71 -0.85 -0.42 -0.70 -0.95 -0.68 -0.53 -0.47 -0.59 -0.42 -0.41
GUATEMALA -0.76 -0.13 -0.05 -0.03 -0.21 -0.09 -0.05 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.08
GUINEA -0.54 -0.43 -0.60 -0.74 -0.97 -0.74 -0.63 -0.50 -0.60 -0.54 -0.56
GUINEA BISSAU 0.09 0.03 0.03 -0.03 -0.19 -0.03 0.08 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.17
GUYANA 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.17
HAITI -0.71 -0.27 -0.05 -0.17 -0.44 -0.24 -0.16 -0.03 -0.12 -0.02 -0.01
HONDURAS -0.89 -0.10 0.03 0.02 -0.21 -0.06 -0.02 0.12 0.05 0.12 0.14
HONG KONG -0.12 -0.72 -0.32 -0.69 -0.99 -0.67 -0.52 -0.39 -0.52 -0.36 -0.36
INDIA -0.70 -0.55 -0.85 -1.09 -1.44 -0.90 -0.53 -0.24 -0.14 -0.20 -0.22
INDONESIA -1.70 -1.14 -1.69 -1.54 -1.42 -1.07 -1.39 -0.28 -0.31 -0.32 -0.34
IRAN 0.13 -0.05 -0.20 -0.33 -0.37 -0.34 -0.33 -0.26 -0.50 -0.30 -0.30
IRAQ -0.35 -0.27 -0.28 -0.26 -0.28 -0.29 -0.26 -0.24 -0.27 -0.24 -0.24
JAPAN -0.28 -0.27 -0.23 -0.25 -0.26 -0.25 -0.24 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.21
LAOS -1.29 -1.25 -1.21 -1.18 -0.76 -1.12 -1.10 -1.44 -1.43 -1.41 -1.39
LIBERIA -0.53 -0.38 -0.57 -0.74 -0.99 -0.61 -0.36 -0.16 -0.10 -0.13 -0.15
MALAYSIA -0.27 -0.61 -0.67 -0.72 -1.03 -0.82 -0.72 -0.54 -0.70 -0.58 -0.59
MALI -2.65 -1.63 -1.53 -0.63 -1.26 -1.96 -1.10 -1.06 -0.95 -1.17 -1.22
MEXICO -0.99 -0.22 -0.09 -0.12 -0.35 -0.20 -0.14 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.07
MYANMAR -0.49 -1.31 -1.09 -1.44 -1.45 -1.03 -1.03 -0.63 -1.22 -0.76 -0.78
NICARAGUA 0.52 0.36 -0.02 0.22 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.28 0.21 0.22 0.20
NIGER -0.18 -0.17 -0.18 -0.21 -0.26 -0.20 -0.16 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
NIGERIA -0.74 -0.86 -0.57 -0.48 -0.70 -0.49 -0.41 -0.43 -0.39 -0.40 -0.40
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2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
PAKISTAN -0.29 -0.73 -0.44 -0.37 -1.13 -0.56 -0.23 -0.11 -0.07 -0.07 -0.08
PANAMA -0.06 0.07 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.00
PARAGUAY -0.33 -0.41 -0.60 -0.40 -0.37 -0.38 -0.35 -0.30 -0.35 -0.30 -0.30
PERU 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.08 0.07
PHILIPPINES -0.57 -0.28 -0.40 -0.27 -0.56 -0.61 -0.30 -0.32 -0.41 -0.31 -0.31
RUSSIA -0.33 -0.76 -0.56 -0.88 -1.15 -0.76 -0.59 -0.38 -0.52 -0.39 -0.40
SAUDI ARABIA -0.69 -0.43 -0.51 -0.65 -0.96 -0.61 -0.38 -0.17 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16
SENEGAL -0.46 -0.46 -0.57 -0.67 -0.88 -0.56 -0.37 -0.27 -0.23 -0.21 -0.22
SIERRA LEONE -1.50 -1.35 -0.90 -0.89 -0.47 -1.41 -0.84 -0.52 -0.54 -0.52 -0.52
SINGAPORE -0.39 -0.64 -0.55 -0.86 -1.18 -0.76 -0.52 -0.32 -0.33 -0.28 -0.30
SOUTH KOREA -0.32 -0.41 -0.36 -0.50 -0.64 -0.47 -0.36 -0.26 -0.27 -0.25 -0.25
SOUTH AFRICA -0.41 -0.38 -0.47 -0.60 -0.78 -0.54 -0.37 -0.22 -0.18 -0.20 -0.21
SRILANKA 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.18 0.15 0.13
SURINAME 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.28
TAIWAN -0.31 -0.72 -0.38 -0.72 -0.94 -0.71 -0.60 -0.44 -0.51 -0.42 -0.42
TANZANIA -0.72 -0.83 -0.69 -0.65 -0.92 -0.62 -0.42 -0.30 -0.25 -0.22 -0.21
THAILAND -0.32 -0.32 -0.27 -0.29 -0.30 -0.29 -0.28 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25 -0.25
TOGO -0.16 -0.32 -0.26 -0.41 -0.61 -0.38 -0.24 -0.14 -0.15 -0.12 -0.13
TURKEY -0.70 -0.34 -0.32 -0.38 -0.61 -0.44 -0.30 -0.21 -0.40 -0.38 -0.43
UAE -0.53 -0.53 -0.65 -0.89 -1.20 -0.76 -0.47 -0.24 -0.19 -0.21 -0.22
URUGUAY -0.44 -0.36 -0.42 -0.35 -0.39 -0.55 -0.49 -0.42 -0.54 -0.44 -0.44
USA -1.10 -0.24 -0.09 -0.11 -0.37 -0.19 -0.14 0.03 -0.05 0.02 0.05
VENEZUELA -0.50 -0.18 -0.20 -0.10 -0.19 -0.15 -0.14 -0.05 -0.13 -0.07 -0.08
VIETNAM 0.07 -1.03 -0.31 -0.98 -1.44 -0.90 -0.68 -0.52 -0.71 -0.46 -0.44
OAFRICA -0.13 -0.28 -0.19 -0.28 -0.54 -0.31 -0.17 -0.08 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08
OASIA -0.15 -0.25 -0.21 -0.30 -0.42 -0.27 -0.19 -0.12 -0.14 -0.11 -0.11
OCARIBBEAN 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.15
OEUROPE -0.18 -0.59 -0.35 -0.57 -0.89 -0.57 -0.40 -0.28 -0.38 -0.31 -0.33
OMIDDLE EAST -0.43 -0.42 -0.49 -0.64 -0.85 -0.58 -0.38 -0.23 -0.21 -0.22 -0.23
OOCEANIA -0.24 -0.44 -0.27 -0.44 -0.59 -0.43 -0.36 -0.28 -0.33 -0.27 -0.26
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2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AUSTRALIA 0.33 -0.01 -1.01 -1.86 -1.94 -1.41 -1.51 -1.11 -0.63 -0.92 -0.94
BANGLADESH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BENIN -2.32 -0.47 -0.24 -0.28 -0.81 -0.56 -0.54 -0.30 -0.53 -0.44 -0.47
BOLIVIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BRAZIL -2.44 -0.52 -0.28 -0.32 -0.90 -0.62 -0.57 -0.31 -0.59 -0.49 -0.52
BURKINA FASO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CAMBODIA -2.36 -0.48 -0.24 -0.28 -0.82 -0.56 -0.55 -0.31 -0.53 -0.45 -0.48
CAMEROON -2.33 -0.47 -0.24 -0.28 -0.81 -0.56 -0.54 -0.30 -0.53 -0.44 -0.47
CANADA -2.62 -0.53 -0.27 -0.31 -0.91 -0.63 -0.61 -0.34 -0.59 -0.50 -0.53
CHILE 0.47 0.95 1.01 0.98 0.80 0.87 0.87 0.93 0.84 0.84 0.80
CHINA 0.23 -0.44 -1.09 -0.99 -0.96 -1.02 -0.46 -0.03 -1.64 -0.23 -0.24
COLOMBIA -2.38 -0.48 -0.25 -0.28 -0.83 -0.57 -0.55 -0.31 -0.54 -0.45 -0.48
COSTARICA -2.62 -0.53 -0.27 -0.31 -0.91 -0.63 -0.61 -0.34 -0.59 -0.50 -0.53
COTE D'IVOIRE -2.37 -0.48 -0.24 -0.28 -0.82 -0.56 -0.55 -0.31 -0.53 -0.45 -0.48
CUBA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ECUADOR -2.57 -0.52 -0.27 -0.31 -0.89 -0.61 -0.60 -0.34 -0.58 -0.49 -0.52
EGYPT -1.08 11.76 7.64 7.90 7.57 6.30 7.71 8.50 11.18 9.40 9.15
ELSALVADOR -2.63 -0.53 -0.27 -0.31 -0.91 -0.63 -0.61 -0.34 -0.59 -0.50 -0.53
EU -0.73 -0.76 -0.67 -0.84 -1.32 -0.87 -0.08 0.04 -1.10 -0.76 -0.78
GAMBIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GHANA -2.06 0.93 0.42 0.25 -0.40 -0.30 -0.32 -0.13 -0.37 -0.36 -0.41
GUATEMALA -2.62 -0.53 -0.27 -0.31 -0.91 -0.63 -0.61 -0.34 -0.59 -0.50 -0.53
GUINEA -2.39 -0.48 -0.25 -0.28 -0.83 -0.57 -0.56 -0.31 -0.54 -0.46 -0.48
GUINEA BISSAU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GUYANA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HAITI -2.56 -0.52 -0.26 -0.30 -0.89 -0.61 -0.60 -0.34 -0.58 -0.49 -0.52
HONDURAS -2.59 -0.52 -0.27 -0.31 -0.90 -0.62 -0.60 -0.34 -0.58 -0.49 -0.52
HONG KONG -1.04 -0.41 -0.67 -0.65 -0.90 -0.81 -0.51 -0.16 -1.14 -0.34 -0.36
INDIA -2.56 -0.52 -0.26 -0.30 -0.89 -0.61 -0.60 -0.34 -0.58 -0.49 -0.52
INDONESIA -2.59 -0.52 -0.27 -0.31 -0.90 -0.62 -0.60 -0.34 -0.58 -0.49 -0.52
IRAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IRAQ -0.54 5.88 2.65 2.06 1.32 0.52 0.81 0.92 -0.60 0.22 0.06
JAPAN -2.97 -0.85 -1.54 -1.05 -1.15 -0.44 -0.66 -0.71 -0.65 -0.85 -0.83
LAOS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LIBERIA -2.41 -0.49 -0.25 -0.29 -0.84 -0.57 -0.56 -0.31 -0.54 -0.46 -0.49
MALAYSIA -2.59 -0.52 -0.27 -0.31 -0.90 -0.62 -0.60 -0.34 -0.58 -0.49 -0.52
MALI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MEXICO -2.64 -0.53 -0.27 -0.31 -0.92 -0.63 -0.62 -0.35 -0.60 -0.50 -0.53
MYANMAR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NICARAGUA -2.60 -0.53 -0.27 -0.31 -0.90 -0.62 -0.61 -0.34 -0.59 -0.50 -0.53
NIGER 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NIGERIA -2.51 -0.51 -0.26 -0.30 -0.87 -0.60 -0.59 -0.33 -0.57 -0.48 -0.51
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2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
PAKISTAN -2.44 -0.49 -0.25 -0.29 -0.85 -0.58 -0.57 -0.32 -0.55 -0.46 -0.49
PANAMA -2.64 -0.53 -0.27 -0.31 -0.92 -0.63 -0.62 -0.35 -0.60 -0.50 -0.54
PARAGUAY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PERU -2.59 -0.52 -0.27 -0.31 -0.90 -0.62 -0.60 -0.34 -0.59 -0.49 -0.53
PHILIPPINES -2.59 -0.52 -0.27 -0.31 -0.90 -0.62 -0.60 -0.34 -0.59 -0.50 -0.53
RUSSIA 0.57 0.69 0.64 0.63 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.60 0.44 0.53 0.53
SAUDI ARABIA -2.10 1.63 0.68 0.40 -0.35 -0.29 -0.31 -0.13 -0.39 -0.38 -0.44
SENEGAL -2.34 -0.47 -0.24 -0.28 -0.81 -0.56 -0.54 -0.31 -0.53 -0.44 -0.47
SIERRA LEONE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SINGAPORE -2.57 -0.52 -0.26 -0.31 -0.89 -0.61 -0.60 -0.34 -0.58 -0.49 -0.52
SOUTH KOREA -0.92 -1.20 -0.73 -0.46 -0.78 -0.54 -0.76 -0.58 -1.18 -0.54 -0.53
SOUTH AFRICA -2.27 -0.39 -0.21 -0.25 -0.78 -0.53 -0.52 -0.29 -0.51 -0.43 -0.46
SRILANKA -2.51 -0.51 -0.26 -0.30 -0.87 -0.60 -0.58 -0.33 -0.57 -0.48 -0.51
SURINAME -2.65 -0.54 -0.27 -0.32 -0.92 -0.63 -0.62 -0.35 -0.60 -0.51 -0.54
TAIWAN -0.83 -0.43 -0.37 -0.86 -1.22 -1.27 -1.13 -0.88 -1.42 -1.08 -1.06
TANZANIA -1.78 2.43 1.07 0.72 -0.03 -0.09 -0.13 -0.01 -0.26 -0.29 -0.36
THAILAND -1.13 10.04 6.20 6.01 5.11 3.80 4.03 3.75 3.53 1.96 1.16
TOGO -2.62 -0.53 -0.27 -0.31 -0.91 -0.63 -0.61 -0.34 -0.59 -0.50 -0.53
TURKEY 2.80 -0.46 1.05 0.60 -0.10 -0.57 0.74 0.10 -0.30 -0.04 -0.05
UAE -1.75 4.23 2.05 1.55 0.57 0.29 0.21 0.27 -0.03 -0.18 -0.31
URUGUAY -2.57 -0.52 -0.27 -0.31 -0.89 -0.61 -0.60 -0.34 -0.58 -0.49 -0.52
USA -2.69 -0.54 -0.27 -0.32 -0.93 -0.64 -0.63 -0.35 -0.61 -0.51 -0.55
VENEZUELA -2.63 -0.53 -0.27 -0.31 -0.92 -0.63 -0.61 -0.35 -0.60 -0.50 -0.53
VIETNAM -2.51 -0.51 -0.26 -0.30 -0.87 -0.60 -0.59 -0.33 -0.57 -0.48 -0.51
OAFRICA -1.06 11.24 7.24 7.39 6.93 5.62 6.67 7.01 8.22 6.04 4.87
OASIA -0.21 -0.31 -0.32 -0.38 -0.47 -0.35 -0.24 -0.16 -0.27 -0.16 -0.16
OCARIBBEAN -2.62 -0.53 -0.27 -0.31 -0.91 -0.63 -0.61 -0.34 -0.59 -0.50 -0.53
OEUROPE -1.29 2.16 0.74 0.30 -0.49 -0.39 0.02 0.11 -0.70 -0.56 -0.62
OMIDDLE EAST -1.89 3.04 1.35 0.92 0.05 -0.06 -0.12 0.00 -0.28 -0.32 -0.40
OOCEANIA -2.45 -0.50 -0.25 -0.29 -0.85 -0.59 -0.57 -0.32 -0.55 -0.47 -0.50
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2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027
ARGENTINA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AUSTRALIA 0.35 0.01 -0.99 -1.84 -1.92 -1.37 -1.47 -1.06 -0.58 -0.86 -0.87
BANGLADESH 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BENIN -2.24 -0.36 -0.11 -0.12 -0.62 -0.32 -0.24 0.06 -0.12 0.04 0.07
BOLIVIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
BRAZIL -2.37 -0.42 -0.16 -0.19 -0.73 -0.41 -0.30 0.01 -0.26 -0.11 -0.10
BURKINA FASO 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
CAMBODIA -2.27 -0.37 -0.11 -0.12 -0.63 -0.33 -0.24 0.06 -0.12 0.04 0.08
CAMEROON -2.25 -0.36 -0.11 -0.12 -0.62 -0.32 -0.24 0.06 -0.12 0.04 0.08
CANADA -2.52 -0.41 -0.12 -0.13 -0.70 -0.36 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
CHILE 0.50 0.98 1.05 1.03 0.87 0.95 0.98 1.07 1.00 1.04 1.03
CHINA 0.23 -0.44 -1.09 -0.99 -0.96 -1.02 -0.46 -0.02 -1.64 -0.23 -0.24
COLOMBIA -2.29 -0.37 -0.11 -0.12 -0.64 -0.33 -0.24 0.06 -0.12 0.04 0.08
COSTARICA -2.52 -0.41 -0.12 -0.14 -0.70 -0.36 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
COTE D'IVOIRE -2.28 -0.37 -0.11 -0.12 -0.63 -0.33 -0.24 0.06 -0.12 0.04 0.08
CUBA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ECUADOR -2.47 -0.40 -0.12 -0.13 -0.69 -0.36 -0.26 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
EGYPT -1.06 11.79 7.67 7.92 7.59 6.32 7.74 8.54 11.24 9.48 9.22
ELSALVADOR -2.53 -0.41 -0.12 -0.14 -0.70 -0.37 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.09
EU -1.09 -1.19 -1.17 -1.41 -1.98 -1.67 -1.14 -1.21 -2.39 -2.30 -2.53
GAMBIA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GHANA -1.98 1.04 0.55 0.40 -0.22 -0.07 -0.01 0.24 0.05 0.13 0.14
GUATEMALA -2.52 -0.41 -0.12 -0.14 -0.70 -0.36 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
GUINEA -2.30 -0.37 -0.11 -0.12 -0.64 -0.33 -0.25 0.06 -0.12 0.04 0.08
GUINEA BISSAU 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GUYANA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
HAITI -2.47 -0.40 -0.12 -0.13 -0.69 -0.36 -0.26 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
HONDURAS -2.49 -0.40 -0.12 -0.13 -0.69 -0.36 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
HONG KONG -0.99 -0.35 -0.60 -0.57 -0.81 -0.71 -0.36 0.02 -0.97 -0.11 -0.10
INDIA -2.47 -0.40 -0.12 -0.13 -0.68 -0.36 -0.26 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
INDONESIA -2.49 -0.40 -0.12 -0.13 -0.69 -0.36 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
IRAN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IRAQ -0.53 5.89 2.65 2.06 1.32 0.52 0.80 0.91 -0.61 0.22 0.06
JAPAN -2.97 -0.84 -1.54 -1.05 -1.14 -0.44 -0.66 -0.71 -0.65 -0.85 -0.83
LAOS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
LIBERIA -2.32 -0.37 -0.11 -0.12 -0.64 -0.33 -0.25 0.07 -0.12 0.04 0.08
MALAYSIA -2.49 -0.40 -0.12 -0.13 -0.69 -0.36 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
MALI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
MEXICO -2.54 -0.41 -0.12 -0.14 -0.71 -0.37 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.09
MYANMAR 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NICARAGUA -2.50 -0.41 -0.12 -0.13 -0.69 -0.36 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
NIGER 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
NIGERIA -2.42 -0.39 -0.12 -0.13 -0.67 -0.35 -0.26 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
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PAKISTAN -2.34 -0.38 -0.11 -0.13 -0.65 -0.34 -0.25 0.07 -0.12 0.04 0.08
PANAMA -2.54 -0.41 -0.12 -0.14 -0.71 -0.37 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.09
PARAGUAY 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PERU -2.49 -0.40 -0.12 -0.13 -0.69 -0.36 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
PHILIPPINES -2.49 -0.40 -0.12 -0.13 -0.69 -0.36 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
RUSSIA 0.57 0.69 0.64 0.63 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.60 0.42 0.51 0.50
SAUDI ARABIA -2.03 1.74 0.81 0.56 -0.15 -0.05 0.00 0.25 0.04 0.12 0.13
SENEGAL -2.25 -0.36 -0.11 -0.12 -0.62 -0.32 -0.24 0.06 -0.12 0.04 0.08
SIERRA LEONE 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
SINGAPORE -2.47 -0.40 -0.12 -0.13 -0.69 -0.36 -0.26 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
SOUTH KOREA -0.91 -1.20 -0.72 -0.45 -0.77 -0.53 -0.75 -0.56 -1.16 -0.52 -0.51
SOUTH AFRICA -2.18 -0.28 -0.08 -0.10 -0.59 -0.31 -0.23 0.07 -0.11 0.04 0.07
SRILANKA -2.41 -0.39 -0.12 -0.13 -0.67 -0.35 -0.26 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
SURINAME -2.55 -0.41 -0.12 -0.14 -0.71 -0.37 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.09
TAIWAN -0.82 -0.42 -0.35 -0.84 -1.20 -1.25 -1.10 -0.84 -1.38 -1.04 -1.01
TANZANIA -1.71 2.52 1.18 0.86 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.32 0.12 0.15 0.14
THAILAND -1.10 10.08 6.25 6.08 5.21 3.95 4.28 4.11 4.06 2.56 1.84
TOGO -2.52 -0.41 -0.12 -0.14 -0.70 -0.37 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.09
TURKEY 2.80 -0.47 1.05 0.59 -0.12 -0.59 0.72 0.07 -0.35 -0.11 -0.15
UAE -1.69 4.32 2.17 1.71 0.76 0.53 0.53 0.67 0.42 0.34 0.28
URUGUAY -2.48 -0.40 -0.12 -0.13 -0.69 -0.36 -0.26 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
USA -2.59 -0.41 -0.12 -0.14 -0.72 -0.37 -0.28 0.07 -0.14 0.04 0.09
VENEZUELA -2.53 -0.41 -0.12 -0.14 -0.70 -0.37 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.09
VIETNAM -2.42 -0.39 -0.12 -0.13 -0.67 -0.35 -0.26 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.08
OAFRICA -1.03 11.26 7.26 7.41 6.96 5.66 6.73 7.12 8.40 6.29 5.20
OASIA -0.21 -0.31 -0.32 -0.37 -0.47 -0.35 -0.24 -0.16 -0.26 -0.16 -0.16
OCARIBBEAN -2.52 -0.41 -0.12 -0.14 -0.70 -0.37 -0.27 0.07 -0.13 0.04 0.09
OEUROPE -1.38 2.01 0.55 0.06 -0.78 -0.75 -0.44 -0.46 -1.40 -1.41 -1.65
OMIDDLE EAST -1.83 3.14 1.47 1.08 0.24 0.18 0.20 0.39 0.15 0.18 0.16
OOCEANIA -2.36 -0.38 -0.12 -0.13 -0.66 -0.34 -0.25 0.07 -0.12 0.04 0.08
